Significant Developments in Veterans Law (2004-2006)
and What They Reveal About the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit by Allen, Michael P.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 40
2007 
Significant Developments in Veterans Law (2004-2006) and What 
They Reveal About the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
Michael P. Allen 
Stetson University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the Social Welfare Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael P. Allen, Significant Developments in Veterans Law (2004-2006) and What They Reveal About the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 40 U. 
MICH. J. L. REFORM 483 (2007). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol40/iss3/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN VETERANS LAW
(2004-2006) AND WHAT THEY REVEAL ABOUT THE
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS
AND THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Michael P. Allen*
Nearly twenty years ago, Congress for the first time created a system for judicial re-
view of decisions denying veterans benefits. Specifically, Congress created an
Article I Court: the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. Veterans
dissatisfied with actions of the Department of Veterans Affairs regarding benefits
could appeal to the Veterans Court. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit provided appellate oversight of the Veterans Court. There simply is
nothing like the Veterans Court elsewhere in American law. Yet, despite its
uniqueness, there has been little scholarly attention to this institution.
This Article begins to fill the gap in the literature through a focused consideration
of the decisions of the Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit from 2004 to 2006.
It has three principal parts. First, it describes the current structure of judicial re-
view in the area and provides a statistical analysis of its operation during the
relevant period. Second, the Article explores the substantive development of veter-
ans law from January 2004 through March 2006. Finally, based on that
substantive law, the Article draws conclusions about the operations of both the Vet-
erans Court and the Federal Circuit.
INTRODUCTION
Nearly one out of every four people in the United States is eligi-
ble to receive some type of benefit administered by the United
States Department of Veterans Affairs (the VA).' The benefits are
wide-ranging, including disability compensation, pensions, life in-
surance, medical care, and educational assistance.2 The scope of
* Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. B.A., University of
Rochester, 1989; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1992. This Article is based on a
presentation made at the Ninth Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims. I owe a debt of gratitude to the staff of the Stetson Faculty Support
Office for work on this project. Finally, I wish to thank the staff of the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform, especially Ms. Breanne Sheetz, for excellent work on the Article.
1. See Department of Veterans Affairs, Fact Sheet: Facts About the Department of Vet-
erans Affairs (May 2006) at 1, www.va.gov/opa/fact/docs/vafacts.pdf. Individuals potentially
eligible for benefits include veterans as well as some family members and survivors. Id. For
ease of reference in this Article, I refer to "veterans benefits" even though some of the bene-
fits at issue are more accurately described as benefits to dependents or survivors of veterans.
2. Id. at 1-3 (providing an overview of benefit programs the VA administers).
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these programs is staggering. For example, in fiscal year 2005, the
VA "provided $30.8 billion in disability compensation, death com-
pensation and pension to 3.5 million people."3 The importance of
these benefits will only increase in the future as veterans return
home from the ongoing conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other
theaters in the "Global War on Terror."
4
For much of our Nation's history, the United States has been
strongly committed to providing veterans with benefits for their
service. Exemplifying this commitment, President Abraham Lin-
coln specifically included a call to support veterans and their
families in the famous conclusion to his second inaugural address
near the end of the Civil War:
With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in
the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to fin-
ish the work we are in, to bind up the nation's wounds, to care
for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow and
his orphan, to do all which may achieve and cherish ajust and
lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.5
Perhaps paradoxically, given the political and societal impor-
tance of these benefit programs, veterans were essentially unable to
obtain any judicial review of decisions denying them benefits for
much of American history.6 That changed in 1988 when Congress
provided for such review, creating a system that is unique in
American law.' But despite the continued importance of veterans
benefits programs and the innovative structure of judicial review
associated with them, few scholars have focused on this area of the
law.' This Article begins to fill the gap.
This Article grew out of an invitation to speak at the Ninth Judi-
cial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans
3. Id. at 1.
4. The VA now lists the "War on Terrorism (2001 - Present)" as one of "America's
Wars" for record-keeping purposes. See Department of Veterans Affairs, Fact Sheet: Amer-
ica's Wars (November 2005) at 1, www.va.gov/opa/fact/docs/amwars.pdf.
5. President Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), in ABRA-
HAM LINCOLN: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 449 (Library of America ed., 1st Vintage
Books 1992), (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
www.bartleby.com/124/pres32html (emphasis added).
6. The history of judicial review of veterans benefits decisions is discussed in detail
below. See infra Part I.A.
7. See Veterans'Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C. (1988)); see also infra Part L.A (discussing
the establishment ofjudicial review in this area).
8. I discuss the limited academic commentary that does exist throughout this Article.
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Claims (the Veterans Court), the entity Congress created in 1988 as
the principal venue for judicial review in the area of veterans bene-
fits.9 To prepare for that event, I reviewed every precedential
opinion concerning veterans law issued from January 2004 through
March 2006 by the three federal courts that have jurisdiction in the
area: the Supreme Court of the United States, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the Federal Circuit), and
the Veterans Court. That review revealed two overarching issues
that form the essential structure for this Article.
First, there was rich growth in the substantive law governing vet-
erans benefits during the period of my review. In addition to
specific "stand-alone" decisions that were unquestionably impor-
tant, distinct patterns also emerged in the development of veterans
law. This Article explores those patterns. They show not only where
veterans law has been but also, perhaps more importantly, where it
may be going.
Second, my review of the precedential decisions identified
broader themes concerning the structure of judicial review in the
area. These themes allow us to ask, and even tentatively answer,
some intelligent questions about the workings of the Veterans
Court after nearly two decades in existence, as well as the relation-
ship between the Federal Circuit and the Veterans Court.
The Article proceeds as follows. First, I summarize the structure
and history of judicial review of veterans benefits, describe the Vet-
erans Court and its method of operation, and provide an overview
of judicial review during the two-year period at issue.'0 Next, I dis-
cuss the significant patterns within the various decisions over the
past two years as a matter of substantive law." Thereafter, I draw
from the decisions of both the Federal Circuit and the Veterans
Court some broader themes about those entities, their relationship
to one another, and their role in the judicial review of veterans
benefits decisions. Finally, I conclude by suggesting that the ex-
perience of the Veterans Court is important for a wide range of
issues and that scholars should focus on this entity as it nears its
twentieth anniversary. I begin the process by suggesting a modest
research agenda.
9. See Veterans' Judicial Review Act § 301, 102 Stat. at 4113-21; see also infra Part L.A
for a detailed description of the Veterans Court and its place in the structure of judicial
review of veterans benefits claims.
10. See infra Part 1.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
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I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF VETERANS BENEFITS DECISIONS
The judicial review of administrative veterans benefits decisions
is unique in American law. A basic understanding of this issue is
crucial to appreciate the majority of this Article. This Part first de-
scribes the current structure of such judicial review and the history
behind that structure.' 3 Thereafter, it considers how that review
operated statistically in the period from January 2004 through
March 2006.1
4
A. The History and Structure ofJudicial Review of
Veterans Benefits Decisions
"Warriors have been rewarded for their service-or their widows
and children have been provided support-since the beginnings of
organized society."'5 This commitment to veterans and their fami-
lies was also a part of the early American experience' 6 and has
remained a part of our country's culture." However, the commit-
ment to providing veterans with benefits in exchange for their
service to the Nation has not included a commitment to providing
an independent review of decisions concerning those benefits. In-
stead, for much of our Nation's history, Congress expressly
precluded almost all judicial review in the area.18
13. See infra Part I.A.
14. See infra Part I.B.
15. IHOR GAWDIAK, ET AL., FED. RESEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CONG., VETERANS BENE-
FITS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
AMERICAN SYSTEM vii (Mar. 1992) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform) [hereinafter VETERANS BENEFITS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW] (study prepared by the
Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under an interagency agreement with
the Veterans Court).
16. See id. at 21-32 (discussing the provision of benefits to war veterans in Colonial
America).
17. See id. at 35-70 (discussing development of veterans benefits law from the Revolu-
tionary War through the late 1980s).
18. See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122 (1994) (noting that "Congress established
no judicial review for VA decisions until 1988, only then removing the VA from what one
congressional report spoke of as the agency's 'splendid isolation'"( citation omitted)). For
detailed commentary about the history and operation of the preclusion ofjudicial review in
this area, see WILLIAM E Fox, JR., THE LAW OF VETERANS BENEFITS: JUDICIAL INTERPRETA-
TION 3-11 (2002); VETERANS BENEFITS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 15, at 40-70;
Frederick Davis, Veterans' Benefits, Judicial Review and the Constitutional Problems of "Positive"
Government, 39 IND. L.J. 183, 185-90 (1964); Kenneth B. Kramer, Judicial Review of the Theoreti-
cally Non-Reviewable: An Overview of Pre-COVA Court Action on Claims for Veteran Benefits, 17
OHIO N.U. L. REv. 99, 99-102 (1990); Richard E. Levy, Of Two Minds: Charitable and Social
Insurance Models in the Veterans Benefits System, 13 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 303, 307-15 (2004);
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Decisions granting or denying veterans benefits are initially
made and reviewed on appeal within the executive agency charged
with responsibility in this area, the VA. 9 In brief, eligible persons
apply for veterans benefits at one of the VA's various Regional Of-
fices (RO) or other local offices located across the country.0 If a
claimant is dissatisfied with the decision of the RO, that person
must submit a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) .2' After receiving an
NOD, the RO is required to prepare a Statement of the Case
(SOC) summarizing the bases for its decision.2
After receiving the SOC, the claimant must perfect an appeal of
the decision by filing certain forms with the Board of Veterans'
Appeal (the Board or BVA) .2 The Board is the entity within the VA
that decides appeals on the majority of benefits matters.24 Before
Congress established judicial review in 1988, the Board's decisions
25were final for all intents and purposes.
The story of how this preclusion ofjudicial review survived for so
long is complex. In the beginning, the absence of review was tied
to the development of the relationship between the federal courts
and the "political" branches of government.2 6 Thereafter, a number
of rationales supported preclusion, including the legal doctrine
that government benefits were mere gratuities to which no person
had a right, coupled with the fear that opening the courts for
Charles G. Mills, Is the Veterans' Benefits Jurisprudence of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit Faithful to the Mandate of Congress?, 17 TOURo L. REV. 695, 695-98 (2001); Robert L.
Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial Review in the Processing of Claims of Veterans' Benefits: A Preliminary
Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 905, 906-07 (1975);Jonathan Goldstein, Note, New Veterans Legisla-
tion Opens the Door toJudicial Review ... Slowly!, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 889,890-98 (1989).
19. The VA was created in 1930. VETERANS BENEFITS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note
15, at 65. Congress elevated the VA to cabinet-level status in 1988. See Department of Veter-
ans Affairs Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-527, 102 Stat. 2635 (1988) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).
20. BOARD OF VETERANS' APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS' AFFAIRS, UNDERSTAND-
ING THE APPEAL PROCESS 7-8 (Jan. 2000) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING THE APPEAL
PROCESS].
21. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a)-(b) (2000) (setting forth the requirement to submit an
NOD and describing its contents).
22. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d).
23. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d) (3).
24. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7104 (describing the composition and jurisdiction of the
Board); see also UNDERSTANDING THE APPEAL PROCESS, supra note 20, at 6-10 (setting forth
the basic contours of the appeal process).
25. See, e.g., Fox supra note 18, at 5-17.
26. See, e.g., Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 409, 413 (1793) (holding that the fed-
eral courts could not participate as "commissions" in awarding veterans benefits because
their decisions would be subject to revision by executive branch officials); see also VETERANS
BENEFITS ANDJUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 15, at 40-45 (discussing early unsuccessful Con-
gressional attempts to enlist the federal courts in review of veterans benefits decisions).
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review would inundate the legal system.2 But for much of the sec-
ond part of the twentieth century, it appears that the principal
obstacle to establishing judicial review was disagreement among
groups representing veterans. 8 The reasons for this disagreement
were multifaceted, but for our purposes, the turning point oc-
curred in the late 1980s when the views of all the veterans
organizations converged on the desirability of some type ofjudicial
29
review.
After much debate over the form that judicial review would
take, 0 Congress passed, and President Ronald Reagan signed into
law, the Veterans' Judicial Review Act. l The Act effected several
significant changes in the law of veterans benefits. 32 For present
purposes, the centerpiece of the Act was its creation of the Veter-
ans Court3 pursuant to Congress's power under Article I of the
Constitution to "constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme
Court." Under the Act, the Court is independent of the VA and
composed of seven judges, who are appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate to fifteen-year terms.35 The Veterans
Court's jurisdiction is tied to that of the BVA, which continues its
appellate role within the VA. 6 Thus, for the first time, the Act pro-
vided for a meaningful and predictably available independent
review of VA benefits decisions.
27. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 18, at 5.
28. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Hagel & Michael P. Horan, Five Years Under the Veterans'Judicial
Review Act: The VA is Brought Kicking and Screaming into the World of Meaningful Due Process, 46
ME. L. Rav. 43, 44-45 (1994) (describing disagreement aboutjudicial review).
29. Fox, supra note 18, at 15; see also id. at 45-46.
30. See id. at 13-16 (describing legislative compromises leading to the current system);
Goldstein, supra note 18, at 897-904 (same).
31. Veterans'Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).
32. For general commentary on the 1988 Act, see Fox, supra note 18, at 17-27; Gold-
stein, supra note 18, at 890-98.
33. See 38 U.S.C. § 7252 (2000). Originally, the Veterans Court was known as the
United States Court of Veterans Appeals. See Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988, 102 Stat.
at 4105. It was renamed the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in 1998. See
Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-368, § 511, 112 Stat. 3315,
3341 (1998) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 7251).
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
35. See 38 U.S.C. § 7253 (2000); see also Fox, supra note 18, at 18-19 (discussing the
composition and structure of the Veterans Court).
36. See 38 U.S.C. § 7252 (2000). This section also explicitly precludes the Veterans
Court from reviewing "the schedule of ratings for disabilities ... or any action of the Secre-
tary in adopting or revising that schedule." Id. § 7252(b). The import of this jurisdictional
restriction was a significant issue during the period I studied. See infra Part II.A.
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The scope of the Veterans Court's review has several important
features for the purposes of this Article. 7 First, only dissatisfied
claimants may appeal a BVA decision to the Veterans Court;"s for
the government, the BVA is the final decision maker. Second, Con-
gress clearly intended the Veterans Court to be an appellate tribunal
and specifically prohibited it from making initial factual determi-
nations." Third, the Veterans Court has great latitude in
determining the composition of the Court that hears appeals. In
particular, Congress provided: "[t]he Court may hear cases by
judges sitting alone or in panels, as determined pursuant to proce-
dures established by the Court."
40
As the first Chief Judge of the Veterans Court described it, he
was the head of "a brand-new court, and one without any antece-
dent .... ,, Ideally, as the Court approaches its twentieth
anniversary, many venues will exist to discuss and debate its suc-
cesses as well as areas for improvement. This Article does not
propose to conduct such a full historical review of the Court and its
• 42
operations. It is, however, a beginning of such an endeavor be-
cause it considers the Court's operation during a period of
significant change. Six of the Court's seven members took the
bench between December 2003 and December 2004.4s Indeed,
only Chief Judge Greene has served on the Court for more than
• • 44
two-and-a-half years as of this writing. Thus, while this Article does
37. The following discussion is a high-level overview of the structure of judicial review
of veterans benefits decisions. I have by no means attempted to provide a comprehensive
treatment of this complex area. Instead, my goal is to present a foundation for understand-
ing the rest of the Article.
38. See 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) ("The Secretary may not seek review of any such decision
[of the Board].").
39. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c) (2000).
40. 38 U.S.C. § 7254(b). I discuss this authority to use single-judge adjudication at sev-
eral points below. See infra Part I.B. (discussing statistics about the procedure) and Part
III.A.1 (discussing potential defects of the procedure).
41. Frank Q. Nebeker, Jurisdiction of the United States Court of Veterans Appeals: Searching
Out the Limits, 46 ME. L. REv. 5, 5 (1994).
42. For an early assessment of the Veterans Court, see Veterans Law Symposium, 46 ME.
L. REv. 1, 66 (1994); see also Fox, supra note 18, at 27-28 (discussing the "early days" of the
Veterans Court).
43. The website of the Veterans Court provides biographies of the judges of the Court.
See U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims Web Page, http://www.vetapp.uscourts.gov
(last visited Jan. 18, 2007) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
Judges Bruce Kasold and Lawrence Hagel took the bench in December 2003. Judge William
Moorman took office in November 2004. Finally, Judges Alan Lance, Robert Davis, and Mary
Schoelen all joined the Court in December 2004. Id.
44. Chief Judge William P. Greene, Jr. became a member of the Court in November
1997. See id.
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not provide a history of the Court, the period under study is highly
reflective of a new era of this judicial experiment.4 5
The Veterans Court, however, is only the first venue of judicial
review in the area of veterans benefits. Any party aggrieved by a
final decision of the Veterans Court, including the VA Secretary,
may appeal to the Federal Circuit and, from a decision of that
court, to the Supreme Court of the United States. 6 However, the
appellate relationship between the Veterans Court and the Federal
Circuit that Congress established does not mirror the usual rela-
tionship between an "inferior" tribunal and a "superior" court.
This special relationship is most evident in the restrictions imposed
on the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit when it reviews decisions
of the Veterans Court. As the Federal Circuit recently summarized:
This Court [the Federal Circuit] reviews decisions of the Vet-
erans Court deferentially. Under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d) (1), we
must affirm a Veterans Court decision unless it is "(A) arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right,
power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory juris-
diction, authority, or limitations, or in violation of a statutory
right; or (D) without observance of procedure required by
law." 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d) (1) (2000). Except for constitutional
issues, we may not review any "challenge to a factual determi-
nation" or any "challenge to a law or regulation as applied to
the facts of a particular case." 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d) (2) (2000). 47
In sum, the Federal Circuit has the power to review decisions of
the Veterans Court with respect to matters of law, but very little else.
This restriction on jurisdiction explains the significant number of
Federal Circuit decisions that dismiss appeals on jurisdictional
grounds.4 In addition, the jurisdictional restriction likely contrib-
utes to the tensions between the Federal Circuit and the Veterans
49Court that are evident from the decisions over the past two years.
45. The Court itself appears to recognize the transition. The theme of the Ninth An-
nual Judicial Conference for the Court held in April 2006 was "New Beginnings." See Ninth
Annual Judicial Conference Materials (2006) (on file with the University of Michigan Jour-
nal of Law Reform).
46. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (2000).
47. Kalin v. Nicholson, 172 F. App'x 1000, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
48. See infra Appendix B at 1-3 (setting forth jurisdictional dismissals at the Federal
Circuit in the period under review and describing the bases for the purported lack of juris-
diction).
49. See infra Part ILI.B for a detailed discussion of the relationship between these courts.
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Of course, I do not mean to diminish the important role that the
Federal Circuit plays in shaping veterans benefits law. It oversees the
legal judgments of the Veterans Court and, as such, performs a criti-
50
cal function in developing the ground rules that govern VA action.
In addition, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction "to review
and decide any challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation
or any interpretation thereof .... ,,5 Such direct regulatory chal-
lenges are important in developing the law for a number of reasons,
not the least of which is that they allow resolution of pure questions
of law before regulations become effective. In other words, there is
no need to wait for an issue to arise in a given appeal as would be
necessary if regulatory challenges required the case-by-case adjudica-
tion that is the hallmark of Veterans Court action.52 Thus, the
Federal Circuit has an important but limited role in the judicial re-
view of veterans benefits decisions.
53
This subpart has explained the basic structure ofjudicial review con-
cerning veterans benefits. The next subpart examines statistically how
that review operated from 2004 to 2006. Thereafter, Part II analyzes
the substantive decisions rendered during the period under review.
B. The Statistical Operation ofJudicial Review of
Veterans Benefits Decisions: 2004-2006
With apologies to the Clerks of Court for the Veterans Court and
the Federal Circuit, I have compiled my own statistics covering the
work of both courts from January 2004 through March 2006.54 I
begin with a consideration of the Federal Circuit in the area of vet-
erans law and then turn to the Veterans Court.
55
50. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d) (2000).
51. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c).
52. The Federal Circuit decided one such direct regulatory challenge during the pe-
riod addressed in this Article. See Disabled Am. Veterans v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 419 F.3d
1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (upholding VA regulations allowing the Board of Veterans Appeals to
obtain and consider internal VA medical opinions in the context of an appeal). I discuss this
substantive issue in more detail below. See infra Part II.D.1.
53. For further discussion of the role of the Federal Circuit in this area, see Fox, supra
note 18, at 26-27; see also infra Part III.B (discussing the role of the Federal Circuit in the
provision of veterans benefits).
54. At points in this study I refer to matters after March 2006. For example, if there
was further action involving a particular decision, such as an affirmance or reversal, I note it.
I did not, however, include such matters in the statistical information I discuss in this sub-
part of the Article, which is restricted to the twenty-seven month period beginning January
1, 2004 and continuing through March 31, 2006.
55. I have no doubt that the experts in the respective clerks' offices at the Veterans
Court and the Federal Circuit might disagree with some of the categorization decisions I
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform[
1. The Federal Circuit
During the time covered by this Article, the Federal Circuit issued
written opinions on nonjurisdictional matters in sixty-three cases on
appeal from the Veterans Court.56 In addition, the Federal Circuit
summarily affirmed nine Veterans Court judgments without issuing
opinions.5 1 I refer to these combined seventy-two cases as "merits
decisions." The Federal Circuit also issued opinions in thirty-three
cases during this period in which the issue was jurisdictional. 5s
Table 1 below summarizes how the Veterans Court fared in the
Federal Circuit's merits decisions, whether by summary affirmance
or through a full opinion.
TABLE 1
FEDERAL CIRCUIT MERITS DECISIONS DISPOSITION -OVERALL
Type of Disposition Percentage of Cases
Affirmed 73.6%
Reversed 25.0%"
Other 1.4%"
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's judgments in
nearly three out of every four cases in which the Circuit Court
made. I present these figures for the purpose of drawing some general conclusions about
the landscape that existed in this area during the period of my study. For this purpose, I
believe my statistics are adequate.
56. Appendix A to this Article sets out a list of the decisions I placed in this category.
The table of decisions summarizes the issue(s) in each case, the decision of the Veterans
Court, and the holding of the Federal Circuit. I have not included in this count the decision
of the Federal Circuit in In re Van Allen, 125 F. App'x 299 (Fed. Cir. 2005), which considered
whether the Federal Circuit should issue a writ of mandamus to the Veterans Court. This
decision is listed as part of Appendix B.
57. These cases are listed in Appendix B to this Article.
58. These decisions are listed in Appendix B to this Article. The jurisdictional issues
essentially broke down into two categories: (1) cases in which the issue involved a factual
dispute or the application of law to facts; or (2) appeals from nonfinal Veterans Court or-
ders, such as remands to the BVA. I have not classified as "jurisdictional" cases in which the
Federal Circuit discussed the jurisdiction of the Veterans Court or the BVA. Rather, I include
such matters as merits decisions.
59. I have included in the reversal category one case in which the Federal Circuit
technically vacated the Veterans Court decision and remanded for further proceedings. See
Johnson v. Nicholson, 127 F. App'x 475 (Fed. Cir. 2005). I included the case in that category
because the Federal Circuit determined that the Veterans Court had made a legal error in
remanding a case to the BVA for compliance with the duties to notify and assist when the
veteran had waived a right to remand on this basis. Id. at 477.
60. In one case the Federal Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. See Sharp v.
Nicholson, 403 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
[VOL. 40:3
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reached the merits.6' However, these statistics tend to mask a seri-
ous issue that lies below the surface of the opinions. Tension often
exists between the two courts over fundamental matters. That ten-
sion has the potential to adversely impact the development of
veterans benefits law.
62
The type of adjudication at the Veterans Court (single judge or
panel) did not appear to make a significant difference in reversal
rates. Overall, single Veterans Court judges rendered fifty-seven of
the seventy-two merits decisions. In other words, 79.1% of the Fed-
eral Circuit merits decisions dealt with single-judge opinions and
20.9% dealt with panel opinions. Table 2 summarizes how single-
judge and panel judgments of the Veterans Court fared at the Fed-
eral Circuit during the past two years. The statistics in Tables 1 and
2 show very little variance in reversal/affirmance rates among all
merits decisions and either single-judge or panel opinions.
TABLE 2
FEDERAL CIRCUIT MERITS DECISIONS DISPOSITION-
VETERANS COURT SINGLE-JUDGE VS. PANEL DECISIONS
Judgment Type Affirmance Reversal Other
Single Judge 75.4% 24.6% 0%
Panel 66.7% 26.6% 6.7%
As most practitioners before the Veterans Court know, the
Court's use of single-judge dispositions is a matter of much
61. I should note that the official statistics provided by the Federal Circuit reflect an
even lower reversal rate during the relevant period. According to information available on
the Federal Circuit website for 2004, the reversal rate for cases appealed from the Veterans
Court was eleven percent. For 2005, the reversal rate was seven percent. See U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit Web Page, http://www.fedcir.gov (follow "Information and
Statistics" hyperlink; then click on the desired year beside the "Statistics" heading) (last
visitedJan. 18, 2007) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform) [here-
inafter Federal Circuit Web Page]. Direct comparisons between my statistics and those of the
Circuit Court are difficult for two main reasons. First, the Federal Circuit operates on a fiscal
year system in which a "year" runs from October 1 through September 30. The work I have
done is based on a calendar year. Second, and more importantly, the Federal Circuit and I
are quite likely counting different things in our calculation of reversal rates. I do not know
the full extent of the Federal Circuit's approach so I cannot fully assess the differences in
our approaches. Nevertheless, as the text makes clear, differences in reversal rate are not
important for present purposes. The key issue is the overall comparison of reversal versus
affirmance, which is consistent between the statistics presented here and those contained in
the Federal Circuit's reports.
62. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of this unique and sometimes stormy relation-
ship.
63. There were no en banc matters considered in Federal Circuit opinions during the
relevant time.
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interest-some would say much dispute. I also believe that there
are significant concerns with such dispositions, though I recognize
that the reality of the Court's caseload makes them essential to its
operations. I return to a discussion of this issue below. 64 For now, I
simply note that single-judge opinions are not significantly more
likely to be reversed on appeal at the Federal Circuit, at least not in
65the past two years. Therefore, this does not appear to be a persua-
sive objection to single-judge dispositions at the Veterans Court.
2. The Veterans Court
While the Federal Circuit has decided relatively few cases, mat-
ters are quite different at the Veterans Court.66 The Clerk of the
Veterans Court has published a summary of the Court's "Annual
Reports" from 1996 to 2005. From reviewing just one year's Annual
Report, it is quite apparent that the Veterans Court has a far more
significant role in developing veterans law than the Federal Circuit
could ever achieve.
64. See infra Part IlI.A.
65. Given the importance of single-judge decisions to the working of the Veterans
Court, it is surprisingly difficult to obtain solid statistics on the matter. For example, al-
though the Clerk of the Veterans Court makes available Annual Reports addressing a
number of issues about the Court's functioning, the type of case disposition is not among
the matters reported. See UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL
REPORTS (1997-2006) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
[hereinafter VETERANS COURT ANNUAL REPORT (Year)], available at
http://www.vetapp.uscourts.gov/annual-report/. Nonetheless, it is clear that a great major-
ity of the Court's cases are decided by single judges. One commentator has recently asserted
that for the years 1999, 2000, and 2002, 92.9% of the Veterans Court's "opinions and orders"
were decided by single judges. See Sarah M. Haley, Note, Single-Judge Adjudication in the Court
of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the Devaluation of Stare Decisis, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 535, 548
(2004); see also Fox, supra note 18, at 242 (asserting that approximately eighty percent of the
case dispositions in the Veterans Court are by singlejudge memoranda); Ronald L. Smith,
The Administration of Single Judge Decisional Authority by the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 279, 282 (2004) (reporting that in Volume 16 of
the VETERANS APPEALS REPORTER there were only 86 published decisions compared with
1073 "memorandum decisions"). Mr. Smith's conclusions concerning the relatively small
number of panel and en banc decisions (i.e., those that are published) largely match mine.
Compare VETERANS COURT ANNUAL REPORTS (2004) & (2005), supra (setting forth Court's
statistics on total number of decisions), with Appendix C (summarizing all panel and en
banc decisions in the twenty-seven month period under consideration in this study).
66. Appendix C to this Article sets forth a summary of all precedential decisions of the
Veterans Court in the period from January 1, 2004 through March 31, 2006. The table pro-
vides the basic facts of each case, the holdings of the Veterans Court, and other relevant
information such as the current status of any appeals.
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In 2005, 3466 new cases were filed at the Veterans Court.17 Dur-
ing that year, the Court issued 1281 "merits" decisions and 624
"procedural" decisions. 8 Finally, the Court considered 877 applica-
tions for attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA)." In total, then, the Veterans Court decided a staggering
2782 cases in 2005, categorized as follows: merits decisions (46%),
procedural decisions (22.4%), and EAJA matters (31.5%).
Much can be gleaned from the statistics on Veterans Court deci-
sions. For example, if one removes matters concerning requests for
extraordinary writs,7" there were 1209 non-writ merits decisions in
2005. Table 3 sets forth the disposition of these cases.71
TABLE 3
VETERANS COURT NON-WRIT MERITS DECISIONS
DISPOSITION IN 2005
Type of Disposition Percentage of Cases
Affirmed BVA Decision 22.4%
Reversed BVA Decision 21.3%
Mixed Outcomes 3.3%
(i.e., affirmed in part, reversed in part,
vacated in part)
Remanded to BVA 53.0%
Thus, when the Veterans Court actually decides a question on
appeal, it is equally likely to reverse the BVA (21.3%) as to affirm a
decision (22.4%). Review of affirmance versus reversal rates, there-
fore, suggests that the Veterans Court is not constitutionally
unfriendly to veterans, at least this was the case in 2005.72 From the
67. See Veterans Court Annual Report (2005), supra note 65. The information the
Clerk of Court provides is based on the Court's fiscal year, which ends September 30. Thus,
the information for "2005" is for October 1, 2004 through September 30, 2005. As with the
Federal Circuit, a direct comparison of the information I developed and that presented by
the Court will not be possible.
68. Id.
69. Id. The EAJA provides a mechanism by which prevailing parties in certain types of
litigation may recover their attorneys' fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000). In 1992, Congress
authorized the Veterans Court to award fees under the EAJA. See Federal Courts Administra-
tion Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506, 4513 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412 (d) (2) (F)).
70. The Veterans Court has the authority under the All Writs Act (as do other federal
courts) to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of [its jurisdiction] and agreeable
to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
71. All information used to prepare Table 3 appears in the Veterans Court Annual Re-
port (2005), supra note 65.
72. It appears that matters were even better from veterans' perspectives in 2004. Ac-
cording to the Clerk's statistics, of the non-writ merits decisions (that were not remanded)
rendered by the Veterans Court from October 1, 2003 through September 30, 2004, 12.1%
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perspective of veterans, the true difficulty is that over half of the
merits decisions in 2005 were remanded to the BVA for some type
of further proceeding.73 This reality has potentially serious conse-
quences, to which I return below.
7 4
This Part has described the structure of judicial review of veter-
ans benefits decisions and the landscape of such review over the
past two years. The next Part analyzes the substantive decisions of
the Federal Circuit and the Veterans Court during the relevant pe-
riod.
II. SIGNIFICANT THEMES IN VETERANS LAW: 2004-2oo6
A review of all the Federal Circuit and Veterans Court opinions
in the period covered by this study reveals a number of significant
decisions. This Part of the Article, however, does not rehearse all of
those developments. 75 Rather, it will highlight the four principal
themes in veterans benefits law from January 2004 through March
2006. Those themes tell much about where veterans law has been
and also about where it is likely going. This Part considers each of
these four themes in turn: (1) the Veterans Court's jurisdiction; (2)
the mandate to "take due account of the rule of prejudicial error";
(3) the requirement to read certain pleadings sympathetically and
its connection to the question of unadjudicated claims; and (4)
certain issues concerning medical examinations. At the conclusion
of this Part, I break my self-imposed rule and address one decision
that has particular significance. That discussion also serves as a
transition to Part II1.
76
were affirmed, 24.5% were reversed, and 2.7% were a mixed disposition. See Veterans Court
Annual Report (2004), supra note 65.
73. Remand statistics were better for veterans in 2005 than in 2004. In 2004, 60.6% of
the non-writ merits decisions were remanded. See id.
74. See infra Part II.C.2.
75. I have included a summary of the significant "stand-alone" decisions in veterans
benefits law as Appendix D to this Article.
76. I have provided basic information throughout this Article concerning the substan-
tive content of veterans benefits law. At times, I have even provided substantial detail about a
given issue. However, I have assumed in this portion of the Article that readers have some
understanding of this area of the law.
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A. Jurisdiction, Jurisdiction, Jurisdiction
One of the most significant themes in the decisions over the past
two years concerns the jurisdiction of the Veterans Court. Both the
Federal Circuit and the Veterans Court itself have been extremely
active in resolving jurisdictional questions. These various decisions
set the stage for further development in the years to come and also
reflect the tensions that exist between the two courts. Roughly
speaking, these decisions fall into two jurisdictional categories:
(1) equitable tolling, which extends a claimant's time to file a No-
tice of Appeal (NOA) at the Veterans Court; and (2) what I refer to
as esoteric expansions of Veterans Court jurisdiction. I discuss each
area below.
1. Equitable Tolling77
It is fair to say that the Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit
have quite different assessments of the timeliness standard to
which claimants should be held when filing an appeal with the
Veterans Court. These differences reveal much about the relation-
ship between these courts as well as the transition that claimants
face from the "non-adversarial" VA proceedings to the adversarial
appellate process. I return to these broader issues in Part III. For
now, this subpart focuses on the jurisdictional doctrine itself.
A claimant who is dissatisfied with a BVA decision may seek re-
view in the Veterans Court by filing an NOA with the Veterans
Court within 120 days after the BVA mails its notice of decision to
the claimant. 8 A recurring issue faced by both the Federal Circuit
and the Veterans Court is whether they will consider a claimant's
reasons for late filing of the NOA. During the past two years, the
Federal Circuit has made clear that the Veterans Court should take
a less restrictive view of the circumstances under which the 120-day
period can be "equitably tolled."7 9
77. The equitable tolling developments of the past two years continue the work started
by the Federal Circuit in 2002 and 2003. See, e.g., Bailey v. Principi, 351 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2003); Santana-Venegas v. Principi, 314 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Jaquay v. Principi, 304
F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc).
78. See 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) (2001) (providing in relevant part that "a person adversely
affected by [a BVA] decision shall file a notice of appeal with the Court within 120 days after
the date on which notice of the decision is mailed...").
79. Of course, the Federal Circuit itself limited the application of equitable tolling in
AFv. Nicholson, 168 F. App'x 407 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In AF, the Federal Circuit affirmed a Vet-
erans Court judgment that equitable tolling principles do not apply to the time
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Early in the period covered by this Article, the Federal Circuit
set the tone for many of its subsequent decisions, at least jurisdic-
tionally. The Federal Circuit reversed the Veterans Court's
dismissal of an appeal as untimely when the veteran had misfiled
his NOA with the BVA instead of the Court within the 120-day pe-
riod.0 The Circuit Court held that such a misfiling, within the
appeal period, showed the requisite "due diligence" and thus
qualified for equitable tolling.8'
The Circuit Court addressed a different, and probably more sig-
nificant, aspect of equitable tolling in Barrett v. Nicholson.82 In that
case, the Federal Circuit reversed the Veterans Court's judgment
and held that a mental illness may justify equitable tolling of the
appellate filing period.83 Specifically, the Federal Circuit articulated
the following test:
[T]o obtain the benefit of equitable tolling, a veteran must
show that the failure to file was the direct result of a mental
illness that rendered him incapable of rational thought or de-
liberative decision making or incapable of handling his own
affairs or unable to function in society.
84
The next year in Arbas v. Nicholson,s  the Federal Circuit again
reversed the Veterans Court on the issue of equitable tolling. This
time, the Circuit Court held that a physical impairment could
requirements in 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a) (providing the effective dates of benefits) because
those rules are not statutes of limitations. Id.
80. Brandenberg v. Principi, 371 F.3d 1362, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Veterans
Court had grudgingly reached a similar conclusion in an earlier case. See Bobbitt v. Prin-
cipi, 17 Vet. App. 547, 551 (2004) (critically discussing the Federal Circuit's general
reasoning about equitable tolling, but stating that the Veterans Court was bound to follow
the decisions).
81. Brandenberg, 371 F.3d at 1363-64.
82. Barrett v. Nicholson, 363 E3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
83. Id. at 1317. Barrett also calls into question a Veterans Court decision issued one
month before in which the Veterans Court rejected equitable tolling in a Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) case. See Thornhill v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 480, 483-86 (2004).
84. Barrett, 363 F.3d at 1321 (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omit-
ted). The Circuit Court also noted that parties who were represented during the period
of incapacity would face a higher burden and that, for all veterans, more would be re-
quired than simply a medical diagnosis alone "or vague assertions of mental problems."
Id. The Federal Circuit later gave more guidance on the tolling standard it laid out in
Barrett. In Van Allen the court affirmed the Veterans Court holding that evidence of a
mental impairment fifteen years before the purported tolling period was not sufficient to
satisfy the standard. Van Allen v. Nicholson, 129 F. App'x 611, 612-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
85. Arbas v. Nicholson, 403 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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also justify equitable tolling if a veteran could otherwise satisfy the
Barrett standard 6
The disagreements in this general area are not limited to equi-
table tolling. The Federal Circuit has also taken a different
approach than the Veterans Court toward the form of NOAs under
the Rules of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims."' In Durr v.
Nicholson, s the Federal Circuit considered the Veterans Court's
dismissal of an appeal as untimely under Rule 3.89 The Veterans
Court had ruled that an appeal was untimely because the claim-
ant's NOA did not specifically identify the BVA decision he was
appealing, and it did not include his telephone number, his VA
claims file number, or his address. 90 The Circuit Court rejected
each of these rationales for dismissing the appeal and, along the
way, criticized the Veterans Court for taking too broad a view of the
jurisdictional impact of its own rules of procedure.9'
The Federal Circuit may have formulated the law of equitable
tolling and the timeliness of appeals, but it is the Veterans Court
that must implement the law in the great majority of cases. While
the Veterans Court is complying with the Brandenberg/BarrettlArbas
principles, it has not embraced the spirit of those decisions.
Claiborne v. Nicholson provides a good example of the Veterans
Court's attitude.92 In that case, an elderly, unrepresented veteran
filed an NOA approximately 30 days after the 120-day appeal pe-
riod had expired.93 The veteran sought the protections of equitable
tolling by asserting that his age and a mental illness (dementia)
caused him to file the NOA late.94 The veteran submitted three
brief statements from doctors as well as medical literature
86. Id. at 1381.
87. VET. App. R. PRACTICE & P. [effective Sept. 13, 2004] (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.vetapp.gov/documents/
Rules ofPracticeandProcedure.pdf.
88. Durr v. Nicholson, 400 E3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
89. Id. at 1375-76. Rule 3 is entitled "How to Appeal." It provides information about
matters such as where to file the NOA, how to serve it, the content of the document, and the
payment of filing fees.
90. Durr, 400 F.3d at 1380-81.
91. Id. at 1380-83.
92. Claiborne v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 181 (2004), aff'd, 173 F. App'x 826 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
93. See id. at 182 (noting that the relevant BVA decision was mailed on July 24, 2002
and that the veteran's NOA was deemed filed as of December 28, 2002).
94. Id. The veteran also claimed that stress caused by the illnesses of his wife and
daughters contributed to his mental confusion. Id.
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discussing dementia. The Veterans Court rejected equitable toll-
ing and dismissed the appeal as untimely filed.96
The Federal Circuit affirmed without opinion the Veterans
Court's decision in Claiborne.97 Yet, despite this agreement as to the
result, it is difficult to reconcile the Veterans Court's attitude in the
opinion with the very concept of equitable tolling. When one reads
the Veterans Court opinion, it is striking not so much because of its
result-it is possible, as the Federal Circuit apparently concluded,
to reach the conclusion the Veterans Court did-but rather by the
overly-restrictive attitude the Veterans Court displayed about equi-
table tolling more generally. For example, the Veterans Court
supported its decision in part by noting that the veteran's medical
evidence stated only that he was "severely impaired" in his mental
processes and by comparing this terminology to the Federal Cir-
cuit's requirement that a claimant be "incapable."9 8 The Court was,
of course, correct in its quotation of both sources, but its approach
to equitable tolling does not place much weight on the notions of
fairness that formed the foundation of the Federal Circuit's deci-
sions.99 In other words, even though both the Federal Circuit and
the Veterans Court reached the same conclusion in Claiborne, that
convergence may mask an important foundational difference be-
tween the courts over the extent that equitable tolling should be
allowed.
I do not mean to suggest that the Veterans Court has abdicated
its responsibility to follow the law set by the Federal Circuit. De-
95. Id. at 183-84. On two of the reports, the doctors merely checked boxes indicating
that the veteran was "severely impaired" as a result of dementia and that this dementia had a
negative impact on his decision-making during the relevant period. Id. at 183. The other
medical opinion was a more traditional one, which ultimately concluded that the veteran
had "symptoms ... compatible with an early dementia, probably degenerative type" during
the relevant period. Id. at 184.
96. Id. at 188. This was actually the second time that the Veterans Court reached this
conclusion. In a single-judge order the Veterans Court dismissed the appeal in 2003. See
Claiborne v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 321 (2003). The Federal Circuit vacated that decision and
remanded the case for further consideration in light of Barrett. Claiborne v. Principi, 103 F.
App'x 387, 388 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
97. See Claiborne v. Nicholson, 173 F. App'x 826 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
98. Claiborne v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 181, 187 (2005).
99. See, e.g., Brandenberg v. Principi, 371 F.3d 1362, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Barrett
v. Principi, 363 F.3d 1316, 1318-21 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In another case, the Veterans Court
declined to decide whether the Barrett principles applied to the late filing of an NOD, the
document necessary to start the appellate process within the VA. See McPhail v. Nicholson, 19
Vet. App. 30, 33-34 (2005). The Veterans Court held that the appellant had abandoned all
claims of error on appeal. Id. at 33. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court deci-
sion, holding that the veteran had not alleged below that he had actually filed an NOD at
any time. McPhail v. Nicholson, 168 F. App'x 952, 952-53 (2006). The Circuit Court de-
clined to reach the issue of whether the Barrett principles applied in that situation. Id.
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spite the obvious disagreement between the two courts on this is-
sue, the Veterans Court has rendered two decisions that are
particularly significant in the development of equitable tolling doc-
trine. First, in Jones v. Principi,'0° the Veterans Court held that the
statutory "duty to assist"'0° does not apply to an appellant's assertion
that he or she is entitled to equitable tolling at the Veterans
Court.1'0 The Veterans Court reasoned that the statutory duty to
assist was limited to the provision of VA benefits and not to the
preservation of procedural rights such as establishing the timeli-
ness of an appeal.' 3
Second, the Veterans Court recently annunciated a three-part
test to assess the appropriateness of equitable tolling under "ex-
traordinary circumstances." 0 Specifically, the Veterans Court held
that equitable tolling would be appropriate when the following
conditions were satisfied:
(1) "the extraordinary circumstance must be beyond
the appellant's control";
10 5
(2) "the appellant must demonstrate that the untimely
filing was a direct result of the extraordinary cir-
cumstances" ; 6 and
(3) "the appellant must exercise 'due diligence' in pre-
serving his appellate rights, meaning that a
reasonably diligent appellant, under the same cir-
cumstances, would not have filed his appeal within
the 120-day judicial-appeal period."0 7
Thus, the Veterans Court has established a test that, on its face,
appears to implement the Federal Circuit's instructions that filing
deadlines are important but not inflexible. Of course, only time
will tell whether the Veterans Court will implement the spirit of the
Circuit Court's rules when applying the test. It does seem certain
100. Jones v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 500 (2004), appeal dismissed sub nom. Jones v. Nichol-
son, 431 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
101. Congress has specified that the "Secretary shall make reasonable efforts to assist a
claimant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the claimant's claim for a benefit
under a law administered by the Secretary." 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a)(1) (2000). This statutory
duty is referred to as the "duty to assist."
102. Jones, 18 Vet. App. At 501-03.
103. Id. at 502.
104. McCreary v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 324, 332 (2005).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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that there will be further development in the law of equitable toll-
ing in the years to come.
2. Esoteric Expansion of Veterans Court Jurisdiction
The other strand of decisions in this area concerns the Federal
Circuit's relatively liberal view of the scope of Veterans Court juris-
diction, which is governed by 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252..° . The full import
of these decisions is not yet clear. There may not be any further
developments along the lines discussed below. On the other hand,
the decisions over the past two years might be only the beginning
of exploring § 7252's meaning.
The first esoteric expansion of jurisdiction enables judicial re-
view of VA decisions that accredit attorneys and others to represent
claimants before the VA.00 In Bates v. Nicholson, an attorney whose
accreditation had been revoked petitioned for a writ of mandamus
in the Veterans Court and requested the Court to direct the Secre-
tary to issue a Statement of the Case (SOC)."° The Secretary had
refused to issue a SOC on the ground that the BVA did not have
jurisdiction over a dispute about accreditation."' The Veterans
Court denied the writ on the ground that the BVA would not have
jurisdiction over the matter and, therefore, the Veterans Court
lacked the authority under the All Writs Act to intervene. 2 The
Federal Circuit reversed the Veterans Court's judgment and di-
rected the Court to issue the requested writ." 3 The Federal
Circuit's decision signals that both the BVA and the Veterans Court
should have a hand in representation issues.
Although the Federal Circuit's decision in Bates is important for
the narrow purpose of representation before the VA, the reasoning
in the case has potentially more significant consequences. The Cir-
cuit Court effectively held that 38 U.S.C. § 511 (a)'s reference to "a
law that affects the provision of benefits by the Secretary""' should
108. 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252, 7261 (2000).
109. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 5901,5904(a) (2000).
110. Bates v. Nicholson, 17 Vet. App. 443, 443-44 (2004), rev'd, 398 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
111. See id. at 443-44.
112. See id. at 444-46.
113. Bates, 398 F.3d at 1366. Thereafter, the Veterans Court issued the writ in compli-
ance with the Federal Circuit's mandate. See Bates v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 197, 198
(2005).
114. 38 U.S.C. § 511 (a) (2000) concerns the finality of the Secretary's benefit decisions.
It insulates those decisions made pursuant to "a law that affects the provision of benefits"
from judicial review except in limited circumstances, one of which is review by the Veterans
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be read broadly. Specifically, the Circuit Court determined that the
phrase refers to any "single statutory enactment that bears a Public
Law number in the Statutes at Large."'1 5 The application of that
rule in Bates led to a finding of jurisdiction because the statutory
accreditation provision was held to be part of a single statute deal-
ing with veterans benefits. How that rule will apply in other
situations remains to be seen, but it certainly has the potential to
expand the Veterans Court's jurisdiction in unforeseen ways.
The second esoteric expansion of jurisdiction concerns § 7252's
restriction on the Veterans Court's jurisdiction. That section pro-
vides:
The Court may not review the schedule of ratings for disabili-
ties adopted under section 1155 of this title or any action of
the Secretary in adopting or revising that schedule." 6
During the past two years the Federal Circuit issued two decisions
in connection with this issue. The first decision is unremarkable
given the statutory language. Specifically, in Wanner v. Principi, 17
the Veterans Court determined that it had jurisdiction to consider
whether a particular diagnostic code was consistent with the under-
lying statute.18 The Federal Circuit reversed and held that
§ 7252(b) should be read broadly: "The statutory scheme ... con-
sistently excludes from judicial review all content of the ratings
schedule as well as the Secretary's actions in adopting or revising
that content.""' 9 Thus, it seemed that the Federal Circuit had for-
mulated a bright-line rule to keep the Veterans Court from hearing
ratings schedule matters.
The potential expansion of jurisdiction-and a fair amount of
confusion-came from the Federal Circuit only three weeks after
Court. See 38 U.S.C. § 511(b)(4) (2000). Thus, by reading § 511(a) broadly, the Federal
Circuit effectively read the Veterans Court's jurisdiction broadly as well.
115. Bates, 398 F.3d at 1361.
116. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(b) (2000). Congress has directed that the Secretary "adopt and
apply a schedule of ratings of reductions in earning capacity from specific injuries or com-
bination of injuries." 38 U.S.C. § 1155 (2000). In essence, this ratings schedule operates
once a veteran has established that he or she has a service-connected disability. At that point,
the ratings schedule specifies how much the veteran's earning capacity is reduced. The
higher the rating, the more the veteran will receive from the VA each month. For a general
discussion of the ratings schedule, see VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL § 3.1.3, at 57 (Barton F.
Stichman & Ronald B. Abrams eds., LexisNexis 2006).
117. Wannerv. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 4(2003).
118. Id. at 13-15.
119. Wannerv. Principi, 370 F.3d 1124, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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Wanner when the Circuit Court decided Sellers v. Principi.20 At issue
in Sellers was whether 38 C.F.R. § 4.13012' expressly adopted the
DSM-IV's definition of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 2 2 and, there-
fore, whether the VA erred by not considering those symptoms in
the case at hand.2 3 The VA argued on appeal to the Federal Circuit
that the Veterans Court had violated the jurisdictional restriction
in § 7252(b) by reviewing a ratings schedule.' 24 The Circuit Court
rejected this argument, holding that the veteran's "argument goes
not to the content of the ratings criteria, but rather to the correct
interpretation of section 4.130, specifically the relationship be-
tween the DSM-IV and the general rating formula.' '125 At no point
in Sellers did the Federal Circuit cite its decision in Wanner.
It is unclear how Wanner and Sellers can be reconciled. Indeed, I
am tempted to paraphrase the Supreme Court's comments about
obscenity here, namely that the Federal Circuit knows what violates
§ 7252(b) when it sees it, but it cannot define it.16 The Veterans
Court has also struggled with these potentially inconsistent deci-
sions.127 This area should be monitored in the coming years to see
how the apparent inconsistency between Wanner and Sellers is re-
solved. The resolution could have a significant impact on the scope
of the Veterans Court's jurisdiction.28
120. Sellers v. Principi, 372 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
121. 38 C.F.R. § 4.130 (1996) sets forth the schedule of ratings for mental disorders.
122. "DSM-IV" refers to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, pub-
lished by the American Psychiatric Association. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS FOURTH EDITION (DSM-IV) (Am. Psychiatric Ass'n 1994). The DSM-IV
is highly influential in mental health circles. As one popular internet site put it: "The book is
typically considered the 'bible' for any professional who makes psychiatric diagnoses in the
United States and many other countries." AllPsych Online, Psychiatric Disorders,
http://allpsych.com/disorders/dsm.html (last visited January 30, 2007) (on file with the
University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
123. Sellers, 372 F.3d at 1323-24.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1324.
126. SeeJacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting
that, while he could not define obscenity, "I know it when I see it").
127. See, e.g., Byrd v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 388 (2005); Smith (Ellis) v. Nicholson, 19
Vet. App. 63 (2005).
128. Another potential esoteric expansion of jurisdiction also looms on the horizon. In
King v. Nicholson, a veteran appealed the BVA's decision that it lacked jurisdiction to review a
VA medical center determination that a particular outpatient therapy "was not an appropri-
ate course of treatment." King v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 406, 407 (2006). The BVA seemed
to have a solid ground for its decision given the wording of 38 C.F.R. § 20.101 (b): "Medical
determinations, such as determinations of the need for and appropriateness of specific types
of medical care and treatment for an individual, are not adjudicative matters and are be-
yond the Board's jurisdiction." 38 C.F.R. § 20.101(b). The Veterans Court surprisingly
vacated the BVA's judgment and remanded the case. King, 19 Vet. App. at 411. The Veterans
Court held, in part, that the Board had failed to consider whether the prohibition in 38
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Finally, there is one other jurisdictional case that does not fit
into either of the earlier categories but is nonetheless significant.
In Kirkpatrick v. Nicholson,'29 the Federal Circuit ruled that BVA de-
cisions remanding matters to a VA Regional Office are not
"decisions" and, therefore, cannot be appealed to the Veterans
Court.' 3 In addition, the Circuit Court held that this rule of "non-
finality" allows no exceptions, as there are in limited circumstances
when the Veterans Court remands matters to the BVA."' While this
principle is not surprising, it is doctrinally important because it de-
lays judicial consideration of a veteran's claim. In any event, the
decisions I have discussed in this subpart underscore the impor-
tance ofjurisdiction to the functioning of the Veterans Court.
B. The Obligation to "Take Due Account of the
Rule of Preudicial Error"
Another important theme that emerged during the past two years
involves the requirement that, in reviewing BVA decisions, the Vet-
erans Court "shall ... take due account of the rule of prejudicial
error." 2 In Conway v. Principi,13 3 the Federal Circuit held that duty-to-
notify claims are not excepted from this statutory command. 3 4 The
Circuit Court stated that the requirement "applies to all Veteran's
Court proceedings"'3 5 and remanded the matter to the Veterans
Court to apply the rule of prejudicial error.136
The Veterans Court dutifully followed the Federal Circuit's di-
rection and issued a significant opinion interpreting § 7261 (b) (2)
and defining the procedures that should be used to "take due
C.F.R. § 20.101(b) applied to a categorical refusal by the VA to use a given medical proce-
dure or only to an individualized denial of treatment. Id. The impression given (although
not stated as a holding) was that the regulation might not be as broad as it appears. Nothing
may ultimately come of this issue, but it provides another example of a potential area for
unique jurisdictional growth.
129. Kirkpatrick v. Nicholson, 417 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
130. Id. at 1365-66.
131. Id.
132. 38 U.S.C. § 7261 (b) (2) (Supp. III 2003).
133. Conway v. Principi, 353 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
134. Id. at 1374. Like the duty to assist, the "duty to notify" is largely a creature of stat-
ute. See 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) (2000). Under this statutory provision, the Secretary must notify
a claimant of certain information, including, most importantly, "any medical or lay evidence,
not previously provided to the Secretary that is necessary to substantiate the claim." Id.
135. Conway, 353 F.3d at 1374.
136. Id. at 1375.
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account" of prejudicial error.137 In Mayfield v. Nicholson,3 8 the Veter-
ans Court adopted the following general principles to guide its
application of the "rule of prejudicial error.'' 39 First, the Veterans
Court provided several formulations for defining "prejudicial er-
ror." The central theme was that prejudicial error implicates the
"essential fairness of the [adjudication] . In this regard, the
Court made clear that a showing of prejudice does not require a
conclusion that the outcome would necessarily have been different
without the error.14 ' The Veterans Court next addressed which
party would carry the burden of proving that an alleged error was
prejudicial. 142 The Court assigned the burden to the claimant and
further indicated that the burden was a heightened one. 143 If a
claimant satisfied this burden, then the Secretary would shoulder
the burden (again a heightened one) to show that the error was
not prejudicial.'" Finally, the Veterans Court provided guidance for
applying the rule of prejudicial error specifically in the context of a
claim concerning a breach of the duty to notify.'
45
137. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 103 (2005), rev'd, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
138. Id.
139. An interesting feature of Mayfield is that much of the opinion is dicta. Writing for
the panel, Judge Steinberg held that the notice provided by the Secretary was sufficient
under the statute. Id. at 123-29. Thus, the Veterans Court's extensive discussion about the
meaning of prejudicial error seems unnecessary. See id. at 111-23. In any event, whether
dicta or not, the Veterans Court has applied the Mayfield analysis in later cases in which er-
rors were found. See, e.g., Kent v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 1, 8-16 (2006); Dingess v.
Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473, 492-501 (2006); Pelea v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 296, 307-09
(2005), appeal dismissed, 159 F. App'x 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Rodriguez v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.
App. 275, 291-95 (2005), appealpending, No. 06-7023 (Fed. Cir.).
140. Mayfield, 19 Vet. App. at 116 (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Green-
wood, 464 U.S. 548, 553-54 (1984)).
141. See id.
142. Id. at 116-20.
143. Id. at 119-20 (requiring that the appellant "[assert] with specificity how an error
was prejudicial.").
144. Id. at 120 (stating that, after claimant satisfies his or her burden, "it becomes the
Secretary's burden to demonstrate that the error was clearly nonprejudicial to the appel-
lant-that is, that the error is not one that affected the essential fairness of the
adjudication." (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
145. Id. at 120-21. The Court in Mayfield and later decisions made clear that a failure of
the "first" notice requirement-the requirement for the VA to advise the claimant of the
evidence that would be necessary to sustain the claim-was, by definition, an error implicat-
ing the fairness of the adjudication. See, e.g., Pelea, 19 Vet. App. at 307; Mayfield, 19 Vet. App.
at 122. The Veterans Court also specifically addressed the rule of prejudicial error in con-
nection with a duty-to-notify claim in Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). In that
case, the Court focused on how the duty to notify operated when the initial disability rating
and the effective date of benefits were at issue. See id. at 484-86. For a good summary of
Mayfield and the rule of prejudicial error in the context of the duty to notify generally, see
VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 116, at §§ 15.3.3.5 to 15.3.3.5.1.
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Practitioners eagerly awaited the Federal Circuit's assessment of
the Veterans Court's guiding rules in Mayfield. But those interested
in this issue will have to wait longer. On April 5, 2006, the Federal
Circuit reversed the Veterans Court's judgment in Mayfield. 46
However, the Circuit Court declined to address the Veterans
Court's holdings concerning the application of the rule of prejudi-
cial error. 47 Instead, the Federal Circuit held that the Veterans
Court had erred by relying on evidence that the BVA had not re-
lied on when it considered the issue. 48 The Circuit Court
remanded the matter to the Veterans Court, leaving for another
day a decision about the Mayfield procedure."9 This issue will as-
suredly be a major one in the immediate future.
C. Of Sympathetic Readings and Unadjudicated Claims
The third major theme in veterans law over the past two years
concerns two distinct topics: the requirement to read pro se
pleadings sympathetically and the question of when claims remain
unadjudicated (and therefore pending at the VA) as a matter of
law. While distinct, these topics share common ground, which
likely explains why both the Federal Circuit and the Veterans Court
have tied the issues together. I have attempted to separate them to
the extent possible given their treatment in the cases. This subpart
begins with a discussion of the sympathetic reading requirement
and then turns to the question of unadjudicated claims.
1. Sympathetic Reading of Pro Se Pleadings
A significant development in the past two years was the Federal
Circuit's reiteration-and perhaps strengthening-of the duty to
"sympathetically read" submissions by pro se claimants. That duty is
not new, having been articulated in 2001 in Roberson v. Principi.
But the Veterans Court apparently did not apply the Roberson rule
as aggressively as the Federal Circuit had envisioned. For example,
the Veterans Court took the position that the Roberson duty did not
146. Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (2006).
147. Id. at 1336-37.
148. Id. at 1333-36.
149. Id. at 1337.
150. Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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apply to claims of clear and unmistakable error (CUE)1 5 1 in earlier
decisions.' 52 However, the Federal Circuit reversed the Veterans
Court in Andrews v. Principi, leaving no doubt that "Roberson re-
quires the RO and the Board to sympathetically read all pleadings
filed pro se, including CUE motions.", 53 At the same time, the Cir-
cuit Court made subsidiary holdings about the duty to read
pleadings sympathetically that better delineated the boundaries of
the doctrine. Specifically, the Federal Circuit held: "Roberson does
not require sympathetic reading of pleadings filed by counsel";
154
and "failure to raise an issue in a CUE motion filed by counsel be-
fore the VA is fatal to subsequently raising the issue before the
Veteran's Court." 5 The full impact of Andrews remains to be seen,
but it could be significant given the prevalence of CUE claims and
pro se litigants in the benefits system.
151. CUE is an issue that the Veterans Court and Federal Circuit encounter frequently.
When a claimant alleges that an earlier decision denying benefits at the administrative level
was the product of CUE, he or she is attempting to alter a final adjudication. Accordingly,
not just any error is sufficient to establish CUE in an earlier decision because such a finding
could undermine a final judgment. As defined in the Code of Federal Regulations:
Clear and unmistakable error is a very specific and rare kind of error. It is the kind of
error, of fact or law, that when called to the attention of later reviewers compels the
conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the result would have
been manifestly different but for the error. Generally, either the correct facts, as they
were known at the time, were not before the Board, or the statutory and regulatory
provisions extant at the time were incorrectly applied.
38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(a) (2006). As a prominent text in veterans law has recognized, "a CUE
motion is a difficult one to win." VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 116, § 14.4, at
1056. For a general discussion of the concept, see Fox, supra note 18, at 163-73.
I note that the shorthand phrase "CUE claim" is technically inaccurate. The correct de-
scription is that an allegation of CUE is a mechanism through which to revise a prior, final
decision. See, e.g 38 U.S.C. § 5109A(d) (2000). I will often use the shorthand phrase "CUE
claim" as the Veterans Court and Federal Circuit often do.
152. See Andrews v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 177, 184-87 (2004), aff'd on other grounds, 421
E3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
153. Andrews v. Principi, 421 F.3d 1278, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Moody v. Principi,
360 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (reiterating that Roberson requires a sympathetic read-
ing of all pro se pleadings submitted to the VA); Szemraj v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1370, 1372-73
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (same). The Veterans Court appears to be taking the Federal Circuit's
commitment to sympathetic reading quite seriously. See, e.g., Beverly v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.
App. 394, 404-06 (2005) (remanding case to BVA to determine whether appellant's pro se
submissions to the BVA reasonably raised an informal claim to reopen an earlier decision).
154. Andmws, 421 F.3d at 1284.
155. Id. at 1284-85.
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2. The Unadjudicated Claim
The second issue in this strand of case law defines when a claim
may be considered "unadjudicated" and, therefore, pending at the
VA. This question is particularly important because of the Federal
Circuit's strong commitment to finality once a claimant has ex-
hausted all avenues for direct appeal. If a claim is unadjudicated,
on the other hand, the finality concerns are not implicated. As
made clear yet again during the past two years, there are only two
exceptions to this rule of finality: (1) submitting new and material
evidence to reopen the finally adjudicated claim; and (2) alleging
CUE in the earlier decision.' 5 This issue relates to the duty to sym-
pathetically read pro se pleadings because the Federal Circuit has
ruled that the VA's violation of its Roberson duty does not render a
claim unadjudicated. As the Circuit Court stated in Andrews, "when
the VA violates Roberson by failing to construe the veteran's plead-
ings to raise a claim, such claim is not considered
unadjudicated but the error is instead properly corrected through
a CUE motion."
57
In addition to the sympathetic reading connection, the Federal
Circuit has specified that the breach of a VA procedural duty in an
earlier decision does not render a matter unadjudicated.158 Simi-
larly, in Bingham v. Nicholson, the Circuit Court affirmed the
Veterans Court's holding that the VA's failure to consider one the-
ory of recovery does not render a denied claim unadjudicated 5 9
Thus, neither a procedural defect nor an inattention to alternative
theories will suffice to keep a claim pending at the VA. In sum, the
clarification of the law in this area is a significant theme worthy of;
mention in the period under study.
156. Norton v. Principi, 376 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Cook v. Principi,
318 F.3d 1334, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). See supra note 151 for a discussion of CUE. "New and
material evidence" is also a term of art. Essentially, the concept is based on a need to pre-
serve finality, and it dictates that an earlier decision will not be revisited unless the factual
basis of the decision has changed. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(b) (2000) (specifying that a claim
previously denied by the BVA "may not thereafter be reopened and allowed and a claim
based on the same factual basis may not be considered"). For a general discussion of the
concept, see Fox, supra note 18, at 153-62.
157. Andrews, 421 F.3d at 1284.
158. Norton, 376 F.3d at 1338-39.
159. SeeBingham v. Nicholson, 421 F.3d 1346, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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D. The Doctor Will See You Now: Medical Matters
As one might expect given the nature of many veterans benefits,
medical matters played an important role in this area of the law
over the past two years. The principal decisions essentially fall into
two categories: (1) those addressing when the BVA itself may seek
expert medical opinions from within the VA; and (2) those provid-
ing guidance about medical examinations generally and the role of
doctors during such exams particularly. The latter point also en-
compasses what the BVA may and may not do when considering
doctors' reports. This subpart discusses each of these issues in turn.
1. The BVA and Obtaining Expert Medical Opinions
Both the Federal Circuit and the Veterans Court addressed the
BVA's authority to obtain and consider medical opinions from
within the VA.' 60 A rule promulgated in 2001 and formally adopted
in 2004 allowed the BVA to obtain an expert medical opinion from
within the VA "when, in its judgment, such medical expertise is
needed for equitable disposition of an appeal."' 6' The Veterans
Court initially considered whether this regulation was valid, even-
tually holding en banc that it was in Padgett v. Nicholson.'62 However,
the mandate and opinion in Padgett were later withdrawn when the
veteran died.'63
The Padgett saga could have caused much uncertainty about the
BVA's authority to obtain and consider expert medical opinions
from within the VA. However, the Federal Circuit avoided the con-
fusion by resolving a direct challenge to the regulation and
allowing the BVA to obtain and consider such information. In Dis-
abled American Veterans v. Secretary,'64 the Circuit Court upheld the
regulation as consistent with the relevant statutory language.
65
160. It is clear that the BVA can obtain expert medical opinions from non-VA doctors.
See 38 U.S.C. § 7109 (2000); see also 38 C.F.R. § 20.901 (d) (2006) (implementing terms of §
7109).
161. 38 C.ER. § 20.901(a).
162. Padgett v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 133, 138-45 (2005) (en banc), withdrawn,
Padgett v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 334 (2005) (en banc).
163. Padgett v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. at 336. An appeal of the Court's decision to dis-
miss the case due to the veteran's death is currently pending before the Federal Circuit. See
Padgett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 236 (2005).
164. Disabled American Veterans v. Secretary, 419 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
165. Id. at 1319-23.
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Thus, it appears settled that the BVA may obtain expert medical
opinions both from within and outside of the VA system.
2. Medical Examinations
The Veterans Court issued a number of precedential decisions
during the past two years concerning the role of medical examina-
tions in the benefits process. I begin with an interesting decision in
which the "duty to assist" took on a dimension that arguably
harmed the veteran. In Kowalski v. Nicholson,'16 the Veterans Court
considered a claim for service connection with respect to hearing
loss.1'" The veteran had submitted a letter from his audiologist that
he argued provided support for his claim."" The VA Regional Of-
fice concluded that it needed additional medical evidence and
scheduled the veteran for a medical exam. 6"" The veteran declined
to report for the exam, claiming that the evidence he had submit-
ted was sufficient for the RO to make a decision. 70 One of the
issues on appeal was whether the VA could order a claimant to
submit to a medical examination under those conditions.
The Veterans Court held that the VA had the regulatory author-
ity to schedule the veteran for an additional hearing examination
unless such an order was arbitrary and capricious, which was not
the case in Kowalski.17' Moreover, the Court noted that "under these
circumstances, any failure by VA to schedule for him an examina-
tion before rejecting his claim could have violated VA's duty to
assist him."72 Thus, Kowalski is important both for its narrow medi-
cal examination holding and for its suggestion that the duty to
assist may require the VA to act over the veteran's objections in cer-
tain circumstances.
In a series of opinions, the Veterans Court also addressed the
role of doctors in the medical examination and the BVA's use of
the information provided by doctors based on such examinations.
The key holdings in this area, both new and reiterations, are sum-
marized here. First, the BVA may not disregard a conclusion
reached by a doctor after examining the veteran solely because the
166. Kowalski v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 171 (2005).
167. Id. at 173.
168. Id. at 173-74.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 177-78.
172. Id. at 178.
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doctor relied on information provided by the veteran, unless the
BVA finds that the information is unreliable 73 or there are contra-
dictory facts in the record.1 74 In addition, the BVA may not
substitute its own "medical judgments" for those of doctors who
have examined the claimant even if the BVA has properly rejected a
given medical opinion .' Finally, the Veterans Court cautioned
doctors that they should not go beyond their medical role in pre-
paring their opinions."6 This reiteration of previous holdings may
prove particularly important in the context of VA doctor examina-
tions. Thus, in its 2004-2006 decisions, the Veterans Court
provided important guidance to the VA about medical examina-
tions, which are often so crucial to a veteran's claims.
This Part has described the four most significant themes in vet-
erans benefits decisions over the past two years. The next Part
analyzes broader issues concerning the structure of the Veterans
Court and its relationship with veterans and the Federal Circuit.
Before doing so, however, I would be remiss not to mention what
may very well be the most significant decision of the Veterans
Court during the period I studied: Ramsey v. Nicholson.
77
In Ramsey, two petitioners sought writs of mandamus directing
the Secretary to rescind certain directives he had issued in re-
sponse to an earlier Veterans Court decision. In that earlier
decision, Smith (Ellis) v. Nicholson,"" the Veterans Court held that,
for a veteran with bilateral tinnitus (ringing in both ears), the rele-
vant statutes required the VA to assign separate disability ratings
for each ear instead of a single rating for both ears together.1
79
173. Coburn v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 427, 432-33 (2006); Kowalski, 19 Vet. App. at
179-80. Interestingly, the Veterans Court also held that while a veteran and his or her
spouse may "opine as to their needs as they are related to [the veteran's disability], they are
not qualified to provide the medical nexus between their disabilities and the perceived [aid
and assistance] needs [of the veteran]." Howell v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 535, 539 (2006).
As such, medical opinions relying solely on such statements are inadequate. Id.
174. Kowalski, 19 Vet. App. at 179-80.
175. Coburn, 19 Vet. App. at 433 ("[W]e caution the Board that, although it may reject
medical opinions, it may not then substitute its own medical judgment for those rejected.").
176. See Sizemore v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 264, 275 (2004) (reprimanding a VA psychia-
trist who had inappropriately addressed in his report whether the claimed in-service
stressors for PTSD had been substantiated).
177. Ramsey v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 16 (2006).
178. Smith (Ellis) v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 63, 78 (2005).
179. See id. The Federal Circuit eventually reversed the Veterans Court's opinion in
Smith v. Nicholson, 451 E3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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Needless to say, the VA was not pleased with the Veterans Court
decision concerning tinnitus. Accordingly, it appealed the Smith
decision to the Federal Circuit.' But the VA also took more ag-
gressive steps to address Smith. In particular, the VA Secretary
directed the Chairman of the BVA to stay the adjudication of "tin-
nitus rating cases affected by [Smith] ... The Secretary took this
action without seeking authority from any court.'2 In effect, the
Secretary's order rendered the Veterans Court decision a mere nul-
lity while the matter was on appeal to the Federal Circuit.
The Veterans Court agreed that the Secretary (as well as the
Board Chairman) has the inherent authority to issue stays.8 3 The
Court held, however, that this authority was limited when a Veter-
ans Court decision was already in place. In the words of the
Veterans Court:
We hold now that the Secretary's authority to stay cases at the
Board does not include the unilateral authority to stay cases at
the Board (or RO) pending an appeal to the Federal Circuit
of a decision of this Court. To allow such a stay would permit a
unilateral action by the Secretary to stay the effect of one of
this Court's decisions pending the Secretary's appeal to the
Federal Circuit.... Such unilateral action by the Secretary is
contrary to the concept ofjudicial review .... 4
The proper procedure was for the Secretary to seek a stay of deci-
sion from the appellate court that had jurisdiction over the case
when the stay was requested.15 As a result, the Veterans Court did
not grant the writ, instead giving the Secretary thirty days to seek a
stay from the Federal Circuit.
8 6
To understand the significance of Ramsey, one must remember
that the Veterans Court is still very much in its infancy. The Court
will not turn twenty until 2008. 17 A key ingredient in the Court's
success will be that it is-and is perceived to be-an independent
180. See Ramsey, 20 Vet. App. at 18-19 (noting that the VA's appeal in Smith was dock-
eted as No. 05-7168 onJuly 11, 2005).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 20.
183. Id. at 26-37. Judge Schoelen dissented on this point. See id. at 40-43 (Schoelen,J.,
dissenting).
184. Id. at 37-38.
185. Id. at 38-39. In this instance, the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction over the appeal.
Id. at 39.
186. Id. at 39.
187. See supra Part L.A (discussing creation of the Veterans Court).
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judicial check on the VA. If the Secretary of Veterans Affairs could
choose to comply with some decisions and not others, the Court
would become merely a shadow of what it was intended to be. Ram-
sey, then, was a defining moment in cementing the authority of the
Veterans Court as just that: a court. Yet, other dangers remain for
the Court and its mission. I turn to those matters in Part III.
III. A BROADER PERSPECTIVE ON THE VETERANS COURT
AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
In addition to setting the boundaries and frontiers of veterans
benefits law, the developments from 2004 to 2006 are also instruc-
tive about the nature of judicial review in this area and its two
principal institutions. The decisions communicate much about the
functioning of the Veterans Court as it nears its twentieth anniver-
sary, the relationship between the Veterans Court and the Federal
Circuit, and, finally, the relationship between veterans and the Vet-
erans Court. In each of these areas, the decisions in the past two
years reveal certain tensions that could make Congress's bold ex-
periment less successful than it otherwise might be. In this Part, I
discuss separately each of the issues highlighted above.
A. The Veterans Court: The Internal Tension Between Its
Roles as Error Corrector and Lawgiver
The Veterans Court has two essential roles that, somewhat para-
doxically, cannot be performed well simultaneously.'88 On the one
hand, Congress created the Court to bring uniformity, transpar-
ency, and cohesion to veterans law through judicial review of
executive action." 9 It was intended to be a "lawgiver" in an area
that had, historically, been immune from such common lawmak-
ing.1 ° At the same time, the Court is clearly meant to correct errors
188. Other commentators have recognized a general tension in all appellate courts be-
tween their error correction and law development roles. See, e.g., Jeffrey 0. Cooper &
Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK.
L. REv. 685, 712-15 (2000); David P. Leonard, The Corectness Function of Appellate Decision-
Making Judicial Obligation in an Era of Fragmentation, 17 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 299, 301-08 (1984).
189. For a good discussion of Congress's motivations in creating the Veterans Court and
imposing judicial review on veterans benefits issues, see Fox, supra note 18, at 13-23; Gold-
stein, supra note 18, at 894-912; see also supra Part L.A (discussing the creation and early work
of the Veterans Court).
190. See Fox, supra note 18, at 18-19 (discussing the Veterans Court's role in creating
case law in an area where none had existed before); Nebeker, supra note 41, at 5 (describing
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made in individual cases within the VA's administrative adjudica-
tion system."" These activities are not mutually exclusive and could
complement each other without much difficulty, except for the
crushing caseload at the Court.9 2 The Veterans Court's need to re-
solve a large number of cases has caused it to neglect its lawgiving
role in many respects."' I discuss this issue below principally in the
context of single-judge adjudication, though I also comment on
the use of full court panels (i.e., en banc consideration).
1. Single-Judge Adjudication
The Veterans Court uses single-judge opinions to resolve the
great majority of its cases.' 94 This device has created an "iceberg
jurisprudence." Like an iceberg with much of its structure under
water, the Veterans Court makes much of its law "below the sur-
face" using single-judge opinions. These singlejudge decisions are
perfectly suited to correcting errors in individual cases.'9 5 They are
the Veterans Court as being "without antecedent" in referring to its mission to engage in
judicial review where none had existed earlier).
191. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 7261 (2000) (setting forth standard of review with indisputable
reference to decisions of the Board in particular cases).
192. See VETERANS COURT ANNUAL REPORTS (1996)-(2005), supra note 65 (noting that
'new cases filed" at the Veterans Court from 1996 through 2005 ranged from a low of 1620
in 1996 to a high of 3466 in 2005). Dean Fox has recently suggested, however, that in the
context of broader veterans benefits issues, the Veterans Court's caseload is disappointing
because "many veterans simply give up after a final, negative BVA decision." William F. Fox,
Jr., Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Veterans Benefits System, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 339,
342 (2004) (noting that the BVA docket in recent years has been over 30,000 cases and that
the BVA decides about 20,000 cases per year but that only a few thousand cases are appealed
to the Court each year); see also Kenneth M. Carpenter, Why Paternalism in Review of the Denial
of Veterans Benefits Claims is Detrimental to Claimants, 13 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 285,292 (2004)
(providing similar statistics based on BVA annual reports).
193. The Veterans Court's dual roles were both undermined by the legislation that cre-
ated the Court. For example, Congress prohibited the VA Secretary from appealing
decisions to the Court. See 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (2000). Thus, the Veterans Court is restricted
to making law in cases where the veteran is denied benefits, and the Court does not correct
errors that favor the veteran. Nevertheless, the Veterans Court does perform the dual func-
tions I have described, albeit only when a veteran has been denied benefits.
194. See supra note 65 (explaining the difficulty in obtaining statistics on the frequency
of single-judge opinions and presenting some information on that subject).
195. This may have been why Congress expressly provided for the use of single judges
in the Veterans Court. See 38 U.S.C. § 7254(b) (2000) ("The Court may hear cases by judges
sitting alone or in panels, as determined pursuant to procedures established by the Court.").
A commentator recently suggested: "[n]o other federal appellate court may exercise similar
power to have a single judge decide an appeal on its merits." Smith, supra note 65, at 279.
Attorney Smith also suggested that Congress may have permitted single-judge adjudication
out of fear that the Court would be overwhelmed with appeals. Id.; see also Haley, supra note
65, at 543 (making the same point).
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not, however, designed to fulfill the lawgiving function and should
not be used in that way.
Dissenters may argue that the Veterans Court does not "make
law" in singlejudge cases because, by definition, single-judge opin-
ions are issued only when no law needs to be made in a given case.
It is true that single-judge opinions are not precedential1 96 and, by
definition at least, cannot be used to establish new rules of law. 97
But this view is overly formalistic and neglects the reality of at least
some singlejudge adjudication.
This is not the place to engage in a systematic analysis of the
Veterans Court's fidelity to the rule that singlejudge adjudication
is not proper when rules of law are being formulated or adjusted.
But there certainly appears to be reason to question whether sin-
gle-judge adjudications are in fact as limited as the Court's rules
196. See, e.g., Bethea v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 252, 254 (1992) (recognizing that en banc
and panel decisions are precedential while single-judge resolutions are not); see also VET.
APP. R. PRACTICE & P. 30(a) (prohibiting citation to non-precedential decisions of the Court
except for matters concerning "the binding or preclusive effect of that action (such as via
the application of the law-of-the-case doctrine)"). The continued viability of Rule 30(a) is
questionable under proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure that
the United States Supreme Court recently forwarded to Congress. One of these amend-
ments provides: "[a] court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial
opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been: (i) designated as
,unpublished,' 'not for publication,' 'non-precedential,' 'not precedent,' or the like; and (ii)
issued on or after January 1, 2007." See Letters of John G. Roberts, Chief Justice, Supreme
Court of the United States toJ. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives and
Dick Cheney, President of the Senate (Apr. 12, 2006) (on file with the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/
courtorders/frap06p.pdf.
197. After an appeal has been filed with the Veterans Court, it is assigned to a "screen-
ingjudge" to determine how that case will be "set for the calendar." See VET. APP. INTERNAL
OPERATING P. I(b) [effective May 25, 2004] (on file with the University of MichiganJournal
of Law Reform) [hereinafter IOP], available at http://www.vetapp.uscourts.gov/documents/
IOP2004.pdf. Thus, the screening judge, which is a rotating position, makes the initial de-
termination as to whether the case will be considered by a single judge or a panel. Id. If the
screening judge determines that a matter is appropriate for single-judge determination, the
screening judge decides the matter. Id. at I (b) (4).
To qualify for single-judge treatment, the screeningjudge must find that the appeal:
(1) does not establish a new rule of law;
(2) does not alter, modify, criticize, or clarify an existing rule of law;
(3) does not apply an established rule of law to a novel fact situation;
(4) does not constitute the only recent, binding precedent on a particular
point of law within the power of the Court to decide;
(5) does not involve a legal issue of continuing public interest; and
(6) the outcome is not reasonably debatable[.]
Id. at 11(b); see also Frankel v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 23, 25-26 (1990) (initially setting forth
the factors now included in the IOP). A procedure exists whereby two judges of the court
may compel panel consideration of an appeal. See IOP, supra, at 11(c). No statistics are avail-
able concerning the frequency with which a screening judge's decision is overruled.
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suggest. For example, critics have asserted recently that the Veter-
ans Court is not following its own Internal Operating Procedures
(IOP) and the Frankel criteria when deciding whether a case is suit-
able for single-judge action.19s As practitioners know, Frankel sets
forth six criteria by which to determine whether summary disposi-
tion is appropriate in a given matter.' Those criteria are now
largely embodied in the Court's IOP as the means by which to as-
certain whether single-judge adjudication is appropriate. Criticisms
have also included purported examples of single-judge opinions
that did not comport with the Court's professed standards. 2°0 I re-
viewed the 2004 cases decided by the Federal Circuit in which the
underlying Veterans Court judgment was rendered by a single
judge. °' In a number of these cases, the legal rule at issue was at
least arguably unsettled.2  Thus, either the lawmaking
function was being utilized even though that law could not later be
cited, or an opportunity to engage in lawmaking was avoided by an
inappropriate use of a single-judge disposition.
However, searching for cases in which a single judge violated the
Veterans Court's IOP (by, for example, applying a new rule of law)
may not be worth the effort. The law evolves through case-by-case
application of legal principles, even when the principles are al-
ready established and the factual background is familiar. This type
of common lawmaking is thwarted, or at the very least stunted, by
broad use of non-precedential, single-judge memorandum deci-
sions. As a result, the Veterans Court is not fulfilling its important
role as formal lawmaker to the extent it otherwise could.
I suggest that the Veterans Court should reconsider its single-
judge procedures in order to better strike the balance between
lawgiving and error correction. The Court has the benefit of
198. See, e.g., Haley, supra note 65, at 549-63; Smith, supra note 65, at 281.
199. Frankel v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 23, 25-26 (1990).
200. See, e.g., Haley, supra note 65, at 549-58; Smith, supra note 65, at 281-82.
201. See infra Appendix A.
202. See, e.g., Barrett v. Principi, No. 02-2382, 2003 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 417, at
*4-5(Veterans Court, June 5, 2003) (granting a motion to dismiss granted and rejecting
equitable tolling for a mental illness), rev'd, 363 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Brandenburg v.
Principi, No. 03-0016, 2003 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 406, at *2-5 (Veterans Court, May
29, 2003) (granting a motion to dismiss and rejecting equitable tolling on the basis that
claimant misfiled the NOA with the RO), rev'd, 371 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Hayslip v.
Principi, No. 01-0269, 2003 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 7, *2-3 (Veterans Court, Jan. 2,
2003) (applying Veterans Claims Assistance Act retroactively), rev'd, 364 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Wagner v. West, No. 99-419, 2000 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1021, at *7-15 (Veter-
ans Court, Oct. 19, 2000) (assigning burden of proof for rebuttal concerning the
presumption of in-service aggravation of certain injuries/diseases), revd sub nom. Wagner v.
Principi, 370 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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eighteen years of experience with its caseload as well as the luxury
now of established law to govern its operations. These conditions
enable the Court to commit itself more directly to the lawgiving
function. A good first step is for the Court to reconsider the Frankel
criteria that govern single-judge adjudication. In addition, to fulfill
its lawgiving function more completely, the Veterans Court should
consider hearing more cases in panels.
03
First, Congress made a special place for the Veterans Court in
the system of judicial review of veterans benefits decisions. °4 The
Court will speak with a more authoritative voice when it does so
through opinions formally considered by a group of experts in vet-
erans law. Moreover, an increase in panel opinions will create more
precedential law.205 This is particularly important in an area where,
for nearly two-hundred years, agency interpretation was essentially
the only law.06
Second, as a general matter, group decision-making leads to bet-
ter opinions than individual judicial consideration. 20 7 Significant
scholarship supports this fundamental position..2 " There are a
number of reasons that group decisions are seen as superior. For
example, groups of individuals are less likely to suffer from any
form of bias (conscious or unconscious) or distorted reasoning
than any person acting individually.29 Fundamentally, the most im-
portant feature of group decisions is that they tend to be better
reasoned and more considered because of the give-and-take
among group members. As described recently by Judge Harry
203. I make a similar suggestion in the next subpart concerning en banc consideration.
See infra Part III .A.2.
204. See supra Part I.A. (discussing the creation of the Veterans Court as well as its place
in the structure ofjudicial review of veterans benefits decisions).
205. See supra notes 196-197 (discussing Veterans Court IOP as well as Court decisions
restricting precedential law to opinions rendered by panels or the full court).
206. See, e.g., Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122 (1994) (citing with approval a de-
scription of the VA as existing in "splendid isolation" with respect to the provision of
veterans benefits before the creation of the Veterans Court).
207. This rationale for increasing panel consideration would apply to both the lawgiver
and error corrector functions of the Veterans Court.
208. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 176-77
(1921) (arguing that appellate decision-making works best when judges work together to
craft opinions); Harry T Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U.
PA. L. REv. 1639 (2003) (arguing that the collegiality among appellatejudges leads to better
reasoned opinions); Chris Guthrie, JeffreyJ. Rachlinski & AndrewJ. Wistrich, Inside the Judi-
cial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777 (2001) (arguing that group judicial decisions are less
likely to be affected by any single judge's unconscious biases); Harry W. Jones, Multitude of
Counselors: Appellate Adjudication as Group Decision-Making, 54 TUL. L. REv. 541 (1980) (sup-
porting group decision-making on a number of fronts).
209. See, e.g., Guthrie et al., supra note 208 (discussing a variety of cognitive issues that
have a lower impact in group decisions).
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Edwards of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit:
During deliberations, judges must hash out what precisely it is
that the court will agree to hold. Arriving at a holding is not a
binary phenomenon that reflects either "sincerity" or "strat-
egy." It is a complex conversation, both in conference and
during the drafting of opinions, in which judges, individually
and collectively, often come to see things they did not at first
see and to be convinced of views they did not at first espouse.
As judges engage with their colleagues on a case, from oral
argument and conference to opinion drafting and revising,
their views evolve out of an interdependent push and pull....
If the end product looks different from what a judge had in
mind at the beginning of the process, that fact reflects the
very nature of the group process in which each judge can only
contribute to a group product that is ultimately attributable to
the court.
210
Thus, both the Veterans Court as an institution and individual liti-
gants would be better served by greater use of formal deliberative
decision-making.'
Three objections could be made at this point. First, one might
argue that the Veterans Court does, in fact, utilize group decision-
making because it requires single-judge decisions to be circulated
to all members of the Court before those decisions are issued.2 2
Such a circulation procedure, however, is not a sufficient proxy for
more traditional, formal group efforts. To begin with, members of
210. Edwards, supra note 208, at 1660-61; see also Jones, supra note 208, at 543.
The livelier the discourse, the more open and genuinely collegial the exchange and
opposition of ideas among the members of the court, the better reasoned the court's
decision is likely to be. And better reasoned decisions are, by and large, sounder deci-
sions in their consequences, for the law and for society. Targets are hit more often by
deliberate aim than by happy accident.
Id.
211. This conclusion is further supported by the high percentage of pro se litigants be-
fore the Veterans Court. See VETERANS COURT ANNUAL REPORTS (1996)-(2005), supra note
65 (setting forth annual pro se rates of filing and disposition). The adversary process can
often compensate for some of the problems inherent in individual decision-making. See
Jones, supra note 208, at 543 (discussing role of adversary system in this respect). In a system
that features a large number of pro se litigants, however, the internal check of the adversar-
ial system is diminished, which makes group decision-making all the more important.
212. See IOP, supra note 197, at II(c).
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the Court have only five days to review singlejudge opinions.1 s
This time constraint will tend to inhibit a full review by the other
judges, even if they could seek extensions. In addition, the opinion
* is essentially in final form by the time it is circulated. At that point,
another judge's comments are corrective in nature instead of sug-
gestions that help to shape the opinion in its more formative
stages. More importantly, however, the benefits of group decision-
making, such as those described by Judge Edwards,1 4 do not simply
come from another pair of eyes reading a decision. Rather, the
benefits flow from a fully integrated, deliberative process that en-
courages give-and-take at a number of points along the decisional
path. Such a rich conversation is not likely to be replicated in a re-
view-before-issuance process.
Second, one might conclude that group decision-making is not
necessary given the high affirmance rate of single-judge decisions
by the Federal Circuit.1 5 A significant affirmance rate, however,
does not mean that singlejudge opinions are equal to those ren-
dered by panels or the full court in other respects. Rather, the
affirmance rate suggests that single judges usually reach the correct
results. While group decision-making may or may not have an im-
pact on the bottom line, its more important role is in enhancing
the quality of opinions.1 6 In other words, more group decision-
making would likely improve the reasoning behind the results.
A third, more meritorious objection concerns what I have de-
scribed above as the Veterans Court's crushing caseload.2 7
Workload unquestionably impacts the deliberative process of any
appellate court. 21 8 It is common sense that a greater number of
cases results in less overall effort devoted to any given case. This is
a particular problem for the Veterans Court."9 The sheer number
of cases may mean that, even if the Veterans Court were inclined to
move away from single-judge dispositions, it could not do so to the
213. Id.
214. See supra text accompanying note 210.
215. See supra Part I.B, Table 2 (showing that single-judge decisions on which the Fed-
eral Circuit considered the merits in 2004-2006 were affirmed in 75.4% of cases).
216. See supra note 208 (collecting sources supporting group decision-making, many of
which are concerned with the quality of decisions as well as the ultimate results).
217. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the Veterans Court's workload).
218. Others have made the same observation. See, e.g.,Jones, supra note 208, at 550.
219. For example, for the 2005 judicial year, the Federal Circuit reported 1555 filings (a
number fewer than the Veterans Court's filings) and had eleven judges and four senior
judges to consider these cases (more judges than in the Veterans Court). Compare Federal
Circuit Web Page, supra note 61 (setting forth statistics for the Federal Circuit), with VETER-
ANS COURT ANNUAL REPORT (2005), supra note 65 (setting forth statistics for the Veterans
Court).
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desired extent. Nonetheless, this obstacle should not dissuade the
Court from moving at all.
2. En Banc Consideration
A related issue in terms of the Veterans Court's lawgiving func-
tion 22 concerns the Court's resistance to considering cases en
banc. 2 ' Indeed, from January 2004 through March 2006, the Vet-
erans Court issued only two en banc opinions.22 Moreover, of all
the opinions the Federal Circuit issued in this period, not a single
one addressed an en banc disposition by the Veterans Court .220 The
experience during the past few years seems to match that of the
Court during its entire existence.224 This bias against en banc con-
sideration is reflected in the Veterans Court IOP: "Decisions by a
full-Court panel are not favored except where necessary to secure
or maintain a uniformity of the Court's decisions or to resolve a
question of exceptional importance ....
As a result of its resistance to en banc consideration, the Court is
missing a prime opportunity to influence the development of vet-
erans law. Congress established a unique system for this Article I
court to resolve all disputes in the area of veterans law.226 Moreover,
the Veterans Court occupies this role largely in a vacuum because
judicial review did not previously. exist in the area.227 Thus, the
Court is engaged in something that, in many respects, has not been
220. This is an important consideration even if one assumes that the current standards
for single-judge adjudication remain in place and are correctly applied.
221. As a technical matter, the Court refers to en banc consideration as action by the
"Full Court." SeeVET. App. R. PRACTICE & P. 35.
222. Both en banc opinions came in the same case. The first one dealt with the BVA's
authority to obtain and consider medical opinions from within the VA and the Veterans
Court's interpretation of the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. Padgett v. Nicholson, 19
Vet. App. 133 (2005) (en banc). The second opinion withdrew the first one due to the death
of the veteran. Padgett v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 334 (2005) (en banc), vacating as moot, 19
Vet. App. 84 (2005).
223. See infra Appendix A (setting forth all precedential opinions by the Federal Circuit
in appeals from the Veterans Court) and Appendix B (setting forth all jurisdictional deci-
sions and summary affirmances by the Federal Circuit concerning appeals from the Veterans
Court).
224. A prominent treatise in the area states: "The Court rarely decided cases en banc.
Since the Court's inception, it has decided fewer than fifty cases in this manner." VETERANS
BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 116, § 15.6.23, at 1220.
225. IOP, supra note 197, § V(a).
226. See supra Part L.A (discussing place of Veterans Court in judicial review of veterans
benefits decisions).
227. See supra Part L.A (describing history of judicial review of administrative veterans
benefits decisions).
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possible since the beginning of the Republic: writing on a clean
slate. The forceful statements of the Veterans Court as a whole-
that is with all the experts involved-should have a greater impact
on relevant audiences like the VA and the Federal Circuit. At the
very least, the benefits of group decision-making228 would be real-
ized if more judges were involved in each decision.
In sum, at this time in its life, the Veterans Court should see
many issues of "exceptional importance" that justify en banc con-
sideration. With the formal input of all its judges,229 the Court
would improve in its role as lawgiver. At a minimum, the Court
should more actively and openly consider whether it hears an in-
creased number of cases en banc in the coming years. 30 Such an
increase in en banc hearings would greatly strengthen the Court's
role as lawgiver, even if the Court took no action concerning the
single-judge issues discussed above. 3'
228. See supra Part III.A.1.
229. Once again, I say "formal input" because the Court's IOP provides that opinions
are circulated to all judges, any one of whom may request that the Court vote on whether to
hear the matter en banc. See IOP, supra note 197, § V(b). For many of the reasons I
discussed above concerning single-judge decisions, that type of participation in the deci-
sion-making process does not substitute for formal en banc treatment.
230. There are some signs that such a discussion might be beginning. In a number of
cases in the past two years, concurrences and dissents addressed requests for en banc con-
sideration. See, e.g., Scarborough v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 322, 322 (2005) (Kasold, J.,
dissenting from denial of en banc consideration); Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 220,
220 (2005) (Steinberg,J., concurring in denial of en banc consideration); Id. at 221 (Kasold,
J., concurring in denial of en banc consideration); Id. at 222 (Hagel, J., dissenting from
denial of en banc consideration); Wells v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 33, 34 (2004) (Steinberg, J.,
dissenting from denial of en banc consideration); Id. at 49 (Kasold, J., dissenting from de-
nial of en banc consideration); Akers v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 561, 561 (2004) (Steinberg, J.,
concurring in denial of en banc consideration); Id. at 562 (Hagel,J., concurring in denial of
en banc consideration); Id. at 564 (Kasold, J., dissenting from denial of en banc considera-
tion). If this trend continues, the Court as a whole may eventually decide to consciously
reevaluate the en banc process.
231. There are additional means by which the Veterans Court could address the tension
between its two roles. One in particular is the adoption of a class action rule that would
enable the Court to address important legal issues in a number of cases at the same time.
Such a rule would allow the Court to serve as lawgiver and error corrector simultaneously,
while also reducing the delays associated with individual appeals. Adopting a class action
rule would require the Court to overrule longstanding precedent. See Lefkowitz v. Derwinski,
1 Vet. App. 439 (1991). In my view, such action is warranted. The Court may eventually
agree to reevaluate LeJkowitz" before he took the bench, Veterans Court Judge Lawrence
Hagel advanced an argument in favor of class action treatment of cases at the Court. See
Hagel & Horan, supra note 28, at 65.
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B. The Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit
The relationship between the Federal Circuit and the Veterans
Court is, in operation, unlike the relationship between most, if not
all, other superior-inferior tribunals.3 In reading the opinions of
these courts, it appears that there is a certain sense of distrust be-
tween them. For example, the Veterans Court seems to believe that
the Federal Circuit does not truly understand veterans law or the
nature of the Veterans Court. On the other hand, the Federal
Circuit seems to believe that the Veterans Court does not under-
stand its own role in this unique area of law. 34 As a result of this
232. I initially described the structural relationship between these courts above. See su-
pra Part I.A. I provide additional analysis of that issue in this subpart of the Article.
233. A prime example of the Veterans Court's attitude in this regard is found in Bobbitt
v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 547, 547-48 (2004), a case in which the Veterans Court had to de-
cide whether an NOA was timely when it was misfiled at the BVA within 120 days of the
decision at issue. The Veterans Court held that equitable tolling principles rendered the
filing timely. Id. at 554. The interesting point for present purposes was the Veterans Court's
attitude toward the Federal Circuit. For example, the Veterans Court expressed a belief that
the Federal Circuit, at some level at least, did not understand the very nature of the Veterans
Court. The Court stated: "[T]he Federal Circuit apparently presumes that this Court is part
of VA and that placing VA on notice satisfies the section 7266 requirement that an NOA be
filed at this Court." Id. at 553. The Veterans Court also lectured the Federal Circuit about
the fact that the Veterans Court is part of an adversarial system, not a component of the
"non-adversarial, pro-claimant adjudication environment" in the VA. Id. at 552. Finally, the
Veterans Court critiqued the logic underlying the Federal Circuit's various equitable tolling
cases even though the Veterans Court ultimately followed them. Id. at 552-54.
Bobbitt is not an isolated case in terms of the Veterans Court's attitude toward the Federal
Circuit. In several cases, the Veterans Court has critiqued the Federal Circuit's reasoning
when a matter has been remanded to the Veterans Court. For example, in one case the
Veterans Court was called upon by the Federal Circuit to articulate "the proper standard(s)
of its review of the Board determination in this case respecting CUE." Andrews v. Principi,
18 Vet. App. 177, 181 (2004) (quoting Andrews v. Principi, 25 F. App'x 997, 998 (Fed. Cir.
2001)). In response to that directive, the Veterans Court responded: "This Court established
more than 11 years ago the proper standard of review for considering Board decisions de-
termining whether CUE had been committed in previous RO decisions .... In accordance
with the directives of the Federal Circuit, this Court here reiterates [that standard]." Id. at
181. See also Suaviso v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 532, 534 n.1 (2006) (commenting that, in an
earlier decision, the Federal Circuit had "inexplicably cited" only to certain matters); Pelea
v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 296, 307 (2005) (observing that, even though the Federal Circuit
recognized that the Veterans Court had applied a rule correctly, "[nievertheless, this case
has been remanded to us."); Bates v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 197, 198 (2005) (noting that
the Federal Circuit remanded the case "notwithstanding" a certain regulation the Veterans
Court had originally concluded prevented it from issuing the writ that the Federal Circuit
was directing it to issue).
These cases reveal a truly unique relationship between an "inferior" and a "superior"
court. While the Veterans Court has not refused to carry out the mandates of the Federal
Circuit, its attitude in these opinions does not promote a cooperative approach to the
growth of veterans law.
234. Prime examples of this attitude are found in the various Circuit Court opinions
concerning equitable tolling and the related doctrines discussed above. See supra Part II.A.1.
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tension, these two courts may not be working together as produc-
tively as Congress envisioned when it charged them with creating a
uniform and effective means ofjudicial review in veterans law.
Yet, some of the responsibility for the tension between the Vet-
erans Court and the Federal Circuit can be laid at the collective
feet of Congress. Congress created a system in which the Veterans
Court is "inferior" to the Federal Circuit in only some ways. Spe-
cifically, while the Federal Circuit has the authority to review
judgments of the Veterans Court, in the absence of a constitutional
question, the Federal Circuit "may not review (A) a challenge to a
factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as
applied to the facts of a particular case., 235 Thus, in a large number
of cases, the Veterans Court's decisions are unreviewable for all in-
tents and purposes. 6 This feature of the statutory relationship
between the two courts likely contributes to the sometimes odd
interaction between them. 7
A number of possible solutions might ease the problematic rela-
tionship between the Federal Circuit and the Veterans Court. I
outline three possibilities below: (1) expanding the Federal Cir-
cuit's appellate jurisdiction; (2) eliminating the Federal Circuit's
appellate jurisdiction; and (3) making the Federal Circuit's appel-
late jurisdiction discretionary.3
A first possible solution is to make the Federal Circuit more in-
volved in the appellate process. For example, perhaps the ban on
jurisdiction contained in § 7292(d) should be repealed and re-
placed with a more traditional appellate relationship. 9 Of course,
adopting this option might-but would not necessarily-require
The upshot of these decisions is that the Federal Circuit appears to view the Veterans Court
as too harsh in its jurisdictional decisions given the nonadversarial atmosphere from which
veterans emerge. Id.
235. 38 U.S.C. § 7296(d) (2) (2000).
236. This explains the significant number ofjurisdictional dismissals in the Federal Cir-
cuit. See infra Appendix B (summarizing jurisdictional dismissals at the Federal Circuit
between January 2004 and March 2006).
237. Other commentators have also noted the oddity of the appellate relationship be-
tween the Federal Circuit and the Veterans Court. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 18, at 221-24;
Levy, supra note 18, at 322-24; Mills, supra note 18, at 702-09. Even Federal Circuit judges
have commented on the relationship. See Comments of Federal Circuit Chief Judge Glenn
Archer, The Federal Circuit's Limited Jurisdiction to Review Decisions of the Court of Veterans Appeals,
contained in the proceedings of THE THIRD JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF VETERANS APPEALS, 8 Vet. App. CLXXXVI-CXCI (Oct. 17, 1994).
238. This Article is not the place to fully debate these possibilities. Rather, this overview
is intended to present a roadmap for future discussion.
239. Professor Levy has also recently noted the tensions between the Veterans Court
and the Federal Circuit and suggested that Congress expand the Circuit Court's jurisdiction.
See Levy, supra note 18, at 322-24.
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Congress to reevaluate fundamental aspects of the Veterans Court,
including its fact-finding abilities. Ultimately, that might be a rea-
son to reject this solution, but it should not prevent the option
from being considered.
A second possibility is to remove the Federal Circuit from the
appellate equation completely. Under this model, appeals from the
Veterans Court would be to the Supreme Court of the United
States via the writ of certiorari. Given the small number of cases the
Supreme Court elects to hear each term, however, the likely impact
of this proposal would be to make the Veterans Court the final ju-
dicial arbiter of veterans benefits in all but the most unusual
240
cases.
Finally, the Federal Circuit could remain involved in the process
either as it is or with expanded jurisdiction and the option to re-
fuse cases on appeal from the Veterans Court (i.e., the equivalent
of a writ of certiorari). This possibility should be considered care-
fully before its adoption. If it was enacted without altering the
current jurisdictional structure, it might cause additional problems
(such as increased delay while a party sought such appellate re-
view) without relieving the tension between the Federal Circuit
and the Veterans Court.
In the meantime, the tension remains between the courts. It is
critical that these two courts work together to ameliorate the prob-
lem while statutory solutions are considered. The turnover in
Veterans Court judges in the past two years may help to relieve the
tension.2 41 But one can never be sure when the "us"/"them" di-
chotomy will appear. After all, the new judges have agreed to
devote a considerable portion of their professional lives to the
Court. One concrete, short-term means of addressing this problem
would be for the Veterans Court to use its authority under
§ 7292(b) to certify appeals to the Federal Circuit on controlling
issues of law.42 Doing so might enable the courts to communicate
240. Such a structure is in place for the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces. See United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, Establishment,
www.armfor.uscourts.gov/Establis.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2007) (on file with the University
of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
241. See supra notes 43-44 (discussing changes in the composition of the Veterans Court
in recent years).
242. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(b) (1) (2000) (setting forth a procedure by which the Veterans-
Court may certify controlling questions of law to the Federal Circuit for resolution). It does
not appear that the Veterans Court has ever used this statutory authority. A search of the
LEXIS "US Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims" database for "7292(b)" turns up only five
citations to the rule in the history of the Veterans Court, all of them denying motions to
certify a question to the Federal Circuit.
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with one another in a way that is not dictated by the parties. It
could have the additional benefit of expediting a lengthy process.
Whatever is decided, this issue should be addressed in an above-
board manner. Not doing so could seriously undermine both
courts and ultimately disadvantage veterans and the VA alike.
C. The Veterans Court and Veterans
The final tension apparent in the decisions over the past two
years is the most important in many respects: the relationship be-
tween veterans and the Veterans Court. Do veterans see the Court
as a friend, an enemy, a source of delay, or some combination?
Certainly, the Veterans Court should not consciously operate to
please veterans as a group. Such an attitude would contradict the
impartiality that is central to the judiciary in this country. However,
given the Veterans Court's unique place in the veterans benefits
system, it should concern itself with the impression veterans have
of the Court and its operation. 4s
The decisions over the past two years reveal two factors in par-
ticular that could cause veterans as a group to lose faith in the
Veterans Court as an institution: (1) the Court's attitude toward
the switch between the "non-adversarial" VA adjudicative process
and the adversarial proceedings before the Court; and (2) the
Court's use of remands versus reversals. I discuss each of these ar-
eas below.
1. Non-Adversarial and Adversarial Processes
The manner in which disputes are resolved within the VA makes
the system of veterans benefits unique. The dispute resolution
mechanism is formally both nonadversarial and paternalistic. This
Article does not join the many debates that rage about these char-
acterizations.244 For present purposes, it suffices that the VA
243. Many of the points discussed in this subpart are also applicable to the Federal Cir-
cuit, though probably to a somewhat lesser extent. The Veterans Court's role as the -first line
of appellate review combined with the jurisdictional limitations imposed on the Federal
Circuit make the Veterans Court more of a target for dissatisfied claimants. Accordingly, this
subpart's focus is on the Veterans Court.
244. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 192, at 60 (criticizing the paternalistic approach in
the current system); Levy, supra note 18, at 2 (discussing in a balanced way various attributes
of the current system of veterans benefits); Gary E. O'Connor, Rendering to Caesar: A Response
to Professor O'Reilly, 53 ADMIN. L. R~v. 343 (2001) (generally defending the current veterans
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describes its benefits mission, including the administra-
215tive/adjudicative process, as nonadversarial and paternalistic.
Thus, a veteran pursuing benefits through the VA can easily be-
come lulled into complacency by rules such as those requiring the
VA to assist claimants2 46 and to notify them of information neces-
sary to make out their claims,4 7 or those entitling veterans to the
"benefit of the doubt" in certain instances.2 " The situation is made
to seem even more nonadversarial by the restrictions placed on
lawyers in the VA adjudicative process.24 9
All of this changes when a veteran appeals to the Veterans Court.
At that point, claimants are immersed in a traditionally adversarial
system, even though most of them are still representing themselves
when they file their appeals. 250 From a veteran's perspective, it may
seem that the Veterans Court has been less than forgiving when
veterans do not make a seamless transition from the nonadversarial
VA environment to the world the Court occupies. In many of the
cases in which the Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit have
clashed, the Veterans Court attempted to rigidly enforce filing
deadlines and other procedural requirements. 25' The Court would
benefits system);James T. O'Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the Veterans Appeals Process is
Needed to Provide Fairness to Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. RaV. 223 (2001) (presenting a highly
critical assessment of the current veterans benefit system).
245. This approach to the provision of benefits is clear from the VA's Mission State-
ment. That document reads in part as follows: "The men and women of the VA are
dedicated to fulfilling the Department's mission and vision and they commit their abilities
and energy to continue the rich history of providing for those that have served America." See
Department of Veterans Affairs, Mission, Vision, Core Values & Goals,
www.va.gov/aboutva/mission.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2007) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). It then continues by listing the following among the
"core values" of the Department: (1) "Veterans have earned our respect and commitment,
and their health care, benefits, and memorial services needs drive our actions."; and (2) "We
will value our commitment to veterans through all contingencies and remain fully prepared
to achieve our mission." Id.
246. See38 U.S.C. § 5103A (2000).
247. See38 U.S.C. § 5103.
248. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (2000); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2006).
249. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c) (2000); see also Levy, supra note 18, at 317-19 (discuss-
ing restrictions on use of attorneys in the VA adjudicative process). There is currently
pending in Congress a bill that would greatly ease these restrictions. See Veterans Choice of
Representation Act of 2006, S. 2694, 109th Cong. (2006). As of the writing of this Article, it
is unclear whether this legislation will pass.
250. See VETERANS COURT ANNUAL REPORTS (2005), supra note 65 (showing a fifty-eight
percent pro se rate at the time of filing in 2005). The pro se representation rate drops
sharply by the time an appeal is closed, but the number of pro se litigants remains signifi-
cant. See, e.g., id. (reporting a twenty-nine percent pro se rate at closure in 2005).
251. See supra Part II.A.1. (discussing cases in this category). Another example of the
Veterans Court's rigid approach can be seen in Mapu v. Nicholson, 397 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2005). The veteran in Mapu was preparing to mail his NOA to the Veterans Court on the last
day of the appeal period. Id. at 1377. Instead of sending the NOA by mail, which would have
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improve its relationship with veterans by more consciously consid-
ering the real-world difficulties caused by the switch from the VA
process to the Court environment.152 For example, the Veterans
Court could more actively embrace the concept of equitable toll-
ing. Moreover, such a change in attitude is warranted because it
would recognize that veterans are at the nip point between two
very different types of adjudication when they file their appeals
with the Court.
2. Of Remands and Reversals
A second, and more practically significant matter, is the Veterans
Court's use of remands instead of reversals when reviewing BVA
decisions. Academics and practitioners alike have criticized the
Court's remand/reversal practices.254 The statistics suggest why this
is so. 255 In a system already beset with delays-and remands within
the VA itself between the BVA and the RO-veterans may perceive
that the Veterans Court aggravates the situation. The Court must
continue to address the remand issue if it is to preserve and aug-
ment its relationship with veterans.
Of course, exactly how the Veterans Court could reduce re-
mands is another matter. Yet, certain steps can be taken with little
resulted in a timely filing under the mailbox rule, the veteran sent the NOA by Federal Ex-
press for faster delivery. Id. The Veterans Court dismissed the appeal as untimely because it
was received one day late and the mailbox rule did not apply to Federal Express. Id. The
Federal Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1382. Both courts are no doubt correct in their interpreta-
tions of the statutes. At the same time, the negative response of veterans toward this decision
and the courts that rendered it is not surprising. [can you provide a citation for the negative
response of veterans?].
252. The transition from the nonadversarial VA system to the adversarial judicial proc-
ess has long been a subject of concern for those within and outside the VA. See, e.g., Charles
L. Cragin, The Impact ofJudicial Review on the Department of Veterans Affairs' Claims Adjudication
Process: The Changing Role of the Board of Veterans' Appeals, 46 ME. L. REv. 23, 30-31 (1994);
Hagel & Hogan, supra note 28, at 46-47, 62-63.
253. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing equitable tolling).
254. For academic commentary, see Fox, supra note 18, at 75-83; Fox, supra note 192, at
347; Levy, supra note 18, at 320-22. For a practitioner's view, see generally VETERANS BENE-
FITS MANUAL, supra note 116, § 15.3.
255. See VETERANS COURT ANNUAL REPORT (2002)-(2005), supra note 65 (noting re-
mand rates per year); see also supra Part I.B (discussing remand issue). Others have noted
that the remand rates at the Veterans Court appear to be significantly greater than those in
other administrative law contexts. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 18, at 320. One can be somewhat
critical of Professor Levy's generalizations comparing two quite different reviews of adminis-
trative action. This is not the place to address whether this is a comparison of oranges and
tangerines or oranges and hamburgers. For now, I simply note that others have made such a
comparison.
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effort. For example, the Veterans Court could remand fewer cases
in which the critical issue is one of law.25" Similarly, the Court could
be more aggressive in its review of Board factual determinations. At
times, the Court has support for ruling that a finding is clearly er-
roneous, and yet the Court remands instead. 57 Finally, the Court
could resist the temptation to raise, on its own, "remandable mat-
ters" that the veteran does not wish to have adjudicated . Each of
these approaches would reduce remands independently. However,
taken together, they could have a greater impact because they are
connected to the Court's attitude about the remand/reversal issue
as a whole.259
The decisions of the Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit
concerning veterans benefits over the past two years have been rich
in many respects. This Part has discussed three respects in which
these decisions illustrate fundamental themes and tensions in the
area. First, the decisions reflect the internal tensions at the Veter-
ans Court concerning its roles as lawgiver and error corrector.
Second, they provide vivid examples of the institutional tensions
between the Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit. Finally, the
decisions suggest that at some levels at least there is a potential dis-
connect between the Veterans Court and veterans as a group. The
next Part briefly suggests how one might use these illustrations to
fashion a research agenda.
256. See, e.g., King v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 406, 410-11 (2004) (remanding for con-
sideration whether bar to regulation in 38 C.F.R. § 20.101(b) concerns a categorical
rejection of medical treatment in all cases or only specific treatment decisions); Theiss v.
Principi, 18 Vet. App. 204, 208-14 (2004) (concluding that VA regulation was invalid, but
remanding for readjudication as to whether home schooling qualified as an "educational
institution").
257. Once again, cases falling into this category are matters of degree. I believe, how-
ever, that several cases can be included in this group. See, e.g., Washington v. Nicholson, 19
Vet. App. 362, 372-74 (2004) (Kasold,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that the majority erred in remanding the case when it could have held that the Board's find-
ing concerning medical nexus was clearly erroneous); Gutierrez v. Principi, 19 Vet. App. 1,
7-11 (2004) (remanding for consideration of Gulf War Syndrome diagnosis in a situation
where the statutory requirements clearly appeared to have been met).
258. See, e.g., Coburn v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. at 439 (2006) (Lance, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority inappropriately refused to accept a veteran's waiver of certain
issues that ultimately led to remand); see alsoJohnson v. Nicholson, 127 F. App'x 475, 475-77
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that it is legal error to remand on a basis waived by the veteran).
259. There are, of course, more dramatic ways in which to reduce remands. For exam-
ple, Congress could remove the barrier that prevents the Veterans Court from finding facts
in the first instance. I am not yet ready to advocate such a change, but it may be worthwhile
to consider whether such a statutory amendment would be beneficial.
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CONCLUSION AND A MODEST RESEARCH AGENDA
When I began my in-depth exploration of veterans law to pre-
pare for my speech at the Veterans Court's Judicial Conference, I
did not fully appreciate the richness of the jurisprudence in the
area. The Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit adjudicate an
extraordinary breadth of issues that have enormous impact on a
large segment of the Nation's population. If nothing else, I hope
this Article has piqued interest in a part of the legal system that has
received scant attention.
My study has also convinced me that much could be gained by
greater academic focus on the Veterans Court and it operations.
For example, the Veterans Court's use of single judges as a means
of appellate decision-making is largely unique.2 ° Studying this de-
vice could lead to a reassessment of the means by which
overburdened appellate courts consider cases. I have suggested
that, as matters currently stand, I am skeptical of this device.2 6 ' But
further study may suggest that the singlejudge method of decision-
making has advantages that are not immediately apparent.
In addition, studying the Veterans Court is important in assess-
ing the utility of subject-specific courts in the federal judiciary (and
elsewhere). A wide body of literature already exists on this sub-
ject.2 2 However, there appears to be renewed interest in the topic
prompted in part by calls to create a de facto specialized immigra-
tion court by restricting appeals in this area to a single federal
court.263 A concentrated study of the Veterans Court should provide
260. See supra Part III.A.
261. Id.
262. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REv.
329 (1991); Christopher A. Chrisman, Article III Goes to War: A Casefor a Separate Federal Cir-
cuit for Enemy Combatant Habeas Cases, 21 J.L. & POL. 31 (2005); George E. Dix, The Death of
the Commerce Court: A Study in Institutional Weakness, 8 J. AM. LEGAL HIST. 238 (1964); Ro-
chelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1 (1989); James R. Elkins, The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals: A Study in the Abdication of
Judicial Responsibility, 1978 DuKE LJ. 113; Michael Landau & Donald Biederman, The Case for
a Specialized Copyright Court: Eliminating the Jurisdictional Advantage, 21 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 717 (1999); Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking
System, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 111 (1990); Sarang Vijay Damle, Note, Specialize the Judge, Not the
Court: A Lesson from the German Constitutional Court, 91 VA. L. REv. 1267 (2005). See also Rich-
ard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article Ill, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 915 (1988) (discussing Article I courts generally); Daniel J. Meltzer, Symposium: Legisla-
tive and Administrative Courts Under Article IIl, 65 IND. L.J. 291 (1990) (discussing Article I
courts generally).
263. See Securing America's Borders Act, S. 2454, 109th Cong. tit. 5, § 501 (2006) (re-
stricting appeals in immigration matters to the Federal Circuit).
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valuable insights into this potential approach to administering jus-
tice.
In conclusion, the Veterans Court is an experiment worthy of
study for a number of reasons. I hope that this Article sparks an
academic discussion of that bold experiment begun nearly twenty
years ago.
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APPENDIX B
FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS (JANUARY 2004-MARCH 2OO6)
JURISDICTIONAL, SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE, DIRECT REGULATORY
CHALLENGES, MISCELLANEOUS
Jurisdictional Dismissals
1. Kince v. Principi, 87 F. App'x 170 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (appeal
from interlocutory order).
2. Caravello v. Principi, 86 F. App'x 423 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (ques-
tion of law applied to facts on CUE claim).
3. Jim v. Principi, 87 F. App'x 737 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (weighing of
evidence and application of law to facts on CUE claim).
4. Dippel v. Principi, 87 F. App'x 740 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (one issue
lacks jurisdiction due to factual issue; other issues lack jurisdiction
due to appeal from non-final Veterans Court order).
5. Hinkel v. Principi, 89 F. App'x 216 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (purely
factual question).
6. Matias v. Principi, 89 F. App'x 737 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (purely fac-
tual question).
7. Maki v. Principi, 91 F. App'x 133 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (purely
question of fact concerning timeliness of appeal).
8. Rossi v. Principi, 91 F. App'x 141 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (purely
question of fact concerning timeliness of appeal).
9. Robles v. Principi, 95 F. App'x 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (purely
factual question).
10. Doherty v. Principi, 99 F. App'x 899 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (purely
factual question).
11. Milton v. Principi, 110 F. App'x 101 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (purely
factual question).
12. Peralta v. Principi, 112 F. App'x 38 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (purely
factual question).
13. Williams v. Principi, 114 F. App'x 386 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (appli-
cation of law to facts).
14. Cabalza v. Principi, 114 F. App'x 391 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (appli-
cation of law to facts).
15. Jackson v. Principi, 115 F. App'x 54 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (applica-
tion of law to facts and/or purely factual question).
16. Henderson v. Principi, 117 F. App'x 766 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(purely factual question).
17. Jones v. Principi, 118 F. App'x 508 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (non-final
Veterans Court decision; on remand).
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
18. Pelegrini v. Principi, 122 F. App'x 993 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (non-
final Veterans Court decision; on remand).
19. Dolor v. Principi, 123 F. App'x 988 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (purely
factual question).
20. Montalbano v. Nicholson, 125 F. App'x 297 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(purely factual question).
21. Mondero v. Nicholson, 129 F. App'x 605 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(purely question of fact concerning timeliness of filing of NOA).
22. Locklear v. Nicholson, 132 F. App'x 366 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(failure to file a timely NOA with the Federal Circuit).
23. Johnson v. Nicholson, 132 F App'x 367 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(purely factual question).
24. Wright v. Nicholson, 143 F. App'x 351 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (non-
final Veterans Court decision).
25. Guillory v. Nicholson, 144 F. App'x 870 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(purely factual question).
26. Martin v. Nicholson, 151 F. App'x 928 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (non-
final Veterans Court decision).
27. Nastor v. Nicholson, 153 F. App'x 735 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (fail-
ure to file a timely NOA with the Federal Circuit).
28. Frasure v. Nicholson, 157 F. App'x 272 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (non-
final Veterans Court decision).
29. Edwards v. Nicholson, 157 F. App'x 272 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(non-final Veterans Court decision).
30. Lowgren v. Nicholson, 157 F App'x 281 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(purely factual question).
31. Jones v. Nicholson, 431 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (non-final
Veterans Court decision).
32. Lopez v. Nicholson, 172 F. App'x 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (ap-
plication of law to facts).
33. Joyce v. Nicholson, 443 F.3d 845 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (non-final
Veterans Court decision).
Summary Affirmances 267
1. Raguine v. Principi, 89 F. App'x 734 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
2. Porter v. Principi, 112 F. App'x 53 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
3. Urban v. Nicholson, 128 F. App'x 154 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
4. Browne v. Nicholson, 135 F. App'x 427 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
267. Claiborne and Urban were panel decisions at the Veterans Court. All other decisions
listed here were rendered by single judges at the Veterans Court.
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5. Yates v. Nicholson, 140 F. App'x 954 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
6. Buggs v. Nicholson, 146 F. App'x 482 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
7. Paige v. Nicholson, 145 F. App'x 680 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
8. Adamczyk v. Nicholson, 159 F. App'x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
9. Claiborne v. Nicholson, 173 F. App'x 826 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Direct Regulatory Challenges
Disabled Am. Veterans v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 419 F.3d 1317
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (upholding regulations allowing the BVA to obtain
and consider internal VA medical opinions in context of appeal).
Mandamus re: Veterans Court
In reVan Allen, 125 F. App'x 299 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (rejecting re-
quest for writ of mandamus to Veterans Court to direct the clerk to
docket his appeal; petitioner refused to identify the BVA decision
from which he purported to be appealing).
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APPENDIX D
Veterans Law Decisions of Note
In this Appendix I provide a brief summary of the important
veterans law decisions of both the Federal Circuit and the Veterans
Court during the past two years. I have not included those cases
dealt with at length in the main body of the Article. My test of sig-
nificance requires that a decision have one of three attributes: (1)
it is likely to affect a large number of claimants; (2) it will funda-
mentally alter the way in which the VA operates; or (3) it
announces ajurisprudentially important rule of law.
ACCRUED BENEFITS
* Terry: The Federal Circuit held that the limitation
on the recovery of accrued benefits in 38 U.S.C.
§ 5121 (a) refers to any two-year period prior to the
veteran's death and not simply the two years imme-
diately prior to the death . 9
BVA MAILING PRACTICES
• Sthele. The Veterans Court held that an appellant
rebutted the presumption of regularity in mailing
of a BVA decision. The holding is of particular im-
portance because it casts broad doubt on the ability
of the Board to rely on the presumption of regular-
ity in the mailing of its decisions, at least under its
current procedures.270
"COMBAT WITH THE ENEMY"
* Sizemore. The Veterans Court held that the term
"combat with the enemy" in 38 U.S.C. § 3.304(f)
does not require that the veteran be attacked and
includes the veteran attacking the enemy.27'
DUTY TO NOTIFY
* Dinges. The Veterans Court's decision is a highly
significant one applying the duty to notify (38
U.S.C. § 5103(a)) to the assignment of an initial
269. Terry v. Principi, 367 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
270. Sthele v. Principi, 19 Vet. App. 11 (2004). For an interesting perspective of one
practitioner concerning Sthele and BVA mailing practices more generally, see TOMMY: A
LAWYER'S GUIDE TO VETERANS AFFAIRS, Issue 1, 2005 at 5-6 (published by the Federal Bar
Association's Veterans Law Section) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
271. Sizemore v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 264 (2004).
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
disability rating and an effective date for benefits.
While the entire opinion must be read to appreciate
it fully, the following general points are especially
significant. (1) The duty to notify applies to all five
elements of a claim, including the rating and effec-
tive date.Y (2) The content of the required notice
is fact-specific. However, as a general matter, the VA
is not required "to provide notice on all potential
disability ratings that can be awarded, the effective
dates that may be assigned, or other claims that may
be filed, where the dispute on these issues is not
reasonably raised in the veteran's application
.... ,273 (3) The Veterans Court provides guidance
about the types of matters that will most often need
to be included in notices dealing with ratings and
effective dates.274 (4) Once a Notice of Disagree-
ment has been received (and assuming that the
initial notice was proper), § 5103(a) no longer ap-
plies, though other aspects of VA-required
assistance remain in place. 5
EAJA MATTERS AND OTHER ISSUES CONCERNING ATTORNEYS' FEES
* Baldridge. The Veterans Court's opinion in this case
is significant for several reasons. The Court
(1) underscored the importance of detailed billing
records in supporting any fee application; 276 (2)
held that this obligation to provide detailed billing
records is even more important when more than
one lawyer is involved in the case;277 (3) noted that,
as a general matter, Veterans Court proceedings are
not sufficiently complicated to justify teams of law-
yers (although it suggested that the VA could
legitimately have teams involved) ;278 (4) asserted
that when the Court wishes to reduce a fee request
it can use gross percentages as opposed to line-by-
line editing279 (a point with which Judge Kasold dis-
272. Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473, 484-87 (2006).
273. Id. at 488.
274. Id. at 486-88.
275. Id. at 491-93.
276. Baldridge v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 227, 234-35 (2005).
277. Id. at 236-41.
278. Id. at 238-39.
279. Id. at 241-43.
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agreed2 8 0 ); and (5) provided detailed guidelines
about the format of an attorney fee request in cases
where more than one attorney represents the
claimant. 
8
* Scarborough: Any case decided by the United States
Supreme Court that touches on veterans law is ipso
facto significant. In Scarborough, the Supreme Court
reversed both the Federal Circuit and the Veterans
Court and held that a timely EAJA attorney fee ap-
plication can be amended after the thirty-day filing
period has run in order to cure a deficiency in the
initial application. In this case, that initial deficiency
was the claimant's failure to allege that the govern-
ment's position had not been substantially
justified.282
* Snyder The Veterans Court held that fees the VA
pays directly to an attorney pursuant to 38 U.S.C.
§ 5904(d) must be based on the amount of past-due
benefits the veteran will actually receive, not simply
2853what he or she is entitled to receive.
ENHANCED DIC PAYMENTS
* Hatch: The Veterans Court held that enhanced DIC
payments may be based on evidence submitted after
the veteran's death.284
JOINT MOTIONS FOR REMAND
* Forcier The Veterans Court was called upon to de-
cide whether ajoint motion to remand entered into
earlier in the case had an impact on whether the
280. Id. at 247-49 (KasoldJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
281. Baldridge, 19 Vet. App. at 240-41.
282. Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004). On remand, the Veterans Court
granted the original application and most of a supplemental application. Scarborough v.
Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 253 (2005). There were two interesting points in the Veterans
Court's actions on remand. First, the Veterans Court refused to award an enhanced hourly
rate for attorney Brian Wolfman (and two others) of the Public Citizens Litigation Group. It
reasoned (incorrectly in my view) that practice before the United States Supreme Court was
not sufficiently "specialized" such that an enhanced rate was warranted. Id. at 262-65. Sec-
ond, the Veterans Court allowed the recovery of fees in the supplemental application,
rejecting an argument that those fees did not result from the government's position, but
rather from the claimant's lawyer's own mistake in filing the defective fee application in the
first place. Id, at 261-62. This holding drew a strong dissent from Judge Kasold when the
Court refused to hear the matter en banc. See Scarborough v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 322
(2005) (Kasold,J., dissenting from denial ofen banc consideration).
283. Snyder v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 445 (2006).
284. Hatch v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 527 (2004).
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BVA decision should be affirmed. The Court held
that the joint motion did not affect its decision
given the general terms of the remand, among
other things. This decision is required reading for
any counsel contemplating entering into a joint
motion to remand a case.28 5
"No INTEREST RULE"
* Sandstrom: The Federal Circuit made clear that the
"no interest rule" applies in the context of CUE
claims, meaning that a veteran cannot argue that
upon the finding of CUE he or she should receive
"real" dollars as opposed to "nominal" dollars. In
other words, a finding of CUE in a 1969 decision
does not mean that a veteran can receive a payment
adjusted to reflect 2006 dollar values.288
PRESUMPTION OF AGGRAVATION
* Wagner The Federal Circuit held that clear and
unmistakable evidence is required to rebut both the
presumption of soundness and the lack of in-service
2517
aggravation.
PRESUMPTION OF SERVICE CONNECTION
* Shedden: The Federal Circuit held that 38 U.S.C.
§ 105(a) creates a presumption of service connec-
tion if an injury or disease manifests itself during a
veteran's active service.2 8
* Thomas: The Federal Circuit held that the VA may
rebut the presumption of service connection in
peacetime set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 105(a) by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.
RETROACTIVITY GENERALLY
* Rodriguez: The Veterans Court held that (1) it is
questionable whether the VA has any authority to
unilaterally decide that a regulation should apply
retroactively; and (2) in any event, a VA regulation
285. Forcier v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 414 (2006).
286. Sandstrom v. Principi, 358 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
287. Wagner v. Principi, 370 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In later cases the Circuit Court
made clear that it was possible to rebut the presumption, see Natali v. Principi, 375 F.3d 1375
(Fed. Cir. 2004), but that it was not easy to do so, see Patrick v. Principi, 103 F. App'x 383
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
288. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
289. Thomas v. Nicholson, 423 E3d 1279, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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cannot have a retroactive effect if it would have a
negative impact on a claimant.
290
SUBSTITUTION OF PARTY UPON DEATH OF CLAIMANT
* Padgett The Veterans Court (en banc) held that,
when a veteran dies while appealing a BVA decision
to the Veterans Court, the appropriate disposition is
to vacate the Board decision and dismiss the appeal
for lack ofjurisdiction.29'
TINNITUS RATINGS
" Smith (Ellis): The Veterans Court held that DC 6260
requires a dual rating for tinnitus, at least for claims
decided prior to June 13, 2003 when a note was
amended to the DC. '2
* Stolasz: The Veterans Court held that the note to DC
6260 purporting to preclude a dual rating for tinni-
tus cannot be applied to claims that were pending
when the regulation became effective (June 13,
2003) because to do so would have an impermissi-
ble retroactive effect.
29 3
VETERANS CLAIMS ASSISTANCE ACT APPLICABILITY
* Luera. The Veterans Court held that the VCAA du-
ties to notify and assist are not applicable to
Chapter 53 issues. The duties are applicable only to
claims for benefits under Chapter 51. 4
* Sims- The Veterans Court held that the VCAA duties
to notify and assist are not applicable to Chapter 55
issues. The duties are applicable only to claims for
benefits under Chapter 51.295
VCAA RETROACTIVITY
* Hayslip, The Federal Circuit held that the Veterans
Claims Assistance Act did not apply to BVA deci-
sions that were final before its enactment.2
6
290. Rodriguez v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 275, 289-90 (2005), appeal docketed, No. 06-
7023 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 10, 2005).
291. Padgett v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 334 (2005) (per curiam), appeal docketed, No. 06-
7037 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2005).
292. Smith v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 63, 76-78 (2005), appeal docketed, No. 05-7168
(Fed. Cir. Apr. 18, 2006).
293. Stolasz v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 355, 360-61 (2005).
294. Lueras v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 435, 438-39 (2004).
295. Sims v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 453, 456 (2006).
296. Hayslip v. Principi, 364 F.3d 1321, 1325-27 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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VETERAN STATUS
* Pelea: The Veterans Court held that claimants do
not lose the right to submit evidence on their
claimed status as a veteran merely because the VA
has submitted a request to the service department
under 38 C.F.R. § 3.203 for service verification.297
297. Pelea v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 296, 306-09 (2005), appeal dismissed, 159 F. App'x
1003 (2005).
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